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Abstract
Adaptive Digital Twins are applicable to a number of fields, including the cy-
bersecurity of industial control systems. This thesis prototypes a Self-Learning
adaptive digital twin and posits an architecture for the creation of digital twins
based on the learnings gained from the prototype. The prototype shows the
efficacy of control theoretical approaches for adaptive digital twins for both
modelling and protecting a system, and the architecture posits a generalised
method for developing adaptive digital twins.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Globally, 196 governments have signed the Paris Agreement (United Nations
Framework Convention on Climate Change, 2015) to limit climate change.
In 2019, Aotearoa New Zealand (NZ) passed the Climate Change Response
Amendment Act into law (Parliamentary Counsel Office of New Zealand,
2019). This legislation mandates net-zero carbon emissions by 2050 and meets
the requirements set out under the Paris Agreement. Achieving this goal re-
quires changes in every part of society. Industrial uses that generate large
quantities of greenhouse gases often have longer lifespans than consumer uses.
For example, NZ’s Ministry of Business, Innovation & Employment (2019a)
find that the average boiler system has an economic lifespan of 15 to 20 years,
though are often used for 20 to 40 years (Ministry of Business, Innovation &
Employment, 2021). Long-lived systems, such as these, take longer to switch
for low-emission versions and make retrofit solutions a more immediately vi-
able option. A problem with retrofit solutions is their security, especially when
current plants were not designed with internet connectivity in mind.
New Zealand’s energy sector, as at 2019, contributed close to 40% of the coun-
try’s total emissions, with 28% of this portion originating from process heat
— the use of energy to create hot fluids or gases produced in an Industrial
13
Control System (ICS) setting, often in the form of steam — (Ministry of Busi-
ness, Innovation & Employment, 2019a). In total, process heat contributed
nine per cent of the country’s total emissions and consumed just over a third
of the total energy demand (Ministry of Business, Innovation & Employment,
2019b, 2021). With the majority of these emissions in the process heat sector
stemming from boiler systems (Ministry of Business, Innovation & Employ-
ment, 2019a), a focus on them creates the biggest effect on emissions. This
reduction is at the heart of the motivation of this thesis.
As stated above, many sites use steam to operate, and this steam is raised
by evaporating deionised water above its boiling point (Sarco, 2018). This
process’ failure states can lead to significant economic damage or the serious
harm or loss of human life. Self-Protecting digital twins can foresee these
failures and take actions to warn or prevent them.
Digital twins — virtual models of a physical system based on real-time sensor
data — that can adapt to changes in the physical twin via Self-Learning allow
for more functional twins that can take protective actions and forecast hypo-
theticals, such as potentially malicious changes to an industrial plant that can
result in catastrophic failures. Furthermore, an adaptive digital twin promises
to create a high-fidelity simulation of the system that can vet changes to the
plant, generate low-noise event reports, and in extreme cases, take preventa-
tive measures. To date, few algorithms for adaptive digital twins have been
proposed due in no small part to the complexity and uncertainty in their
requirements. To forward these ends, this project proposes an architecture
and engineering method for creating Self-Learning and Self-Protecting Dig-
ital Twins, thereby making them adaptive. Such an adaptive digital twin
fulfills Weyns (2018)
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Moving toward the Internet of Things (IoT) — the use of many internet-
connected sensors and actuators — in industrial control provides excellent
operational visibility, and when combined with Cloud computing, offers oper-
ational optimisation. Cloud computing would give plants access to exceedingly
large amounts of computation resources at low cost; however, allowing ICSs
access to external networks is fraught with risk (Anton, Hafner, & Schotten,
2019). There are well-founded reasons for such an inherently risky proposition
to not be adopted today, but the future adoption of such technology is pivotal
for mitigating the effects of climate change. Handling this risk by develop-
ing a framework that guarantees quality in the presence of uncertainty is a
motivating goal of this thesis.
To reiterate, securing the future of energy systems is an open problem. In
furtherance of that goal, adaptive digital twins promise to provide a system
that vets inputs, generates actionable reports, and takes measures to prevent
damage to the plant. This thesis implements a digital twin of an energy system
and uses the learnings of said implementation to contribute to the engineering
design of future digital twins.
1.1 Background
Reducing the impact of the process heat sector on the environment requires
radical changes to global energy technology. Part of this shift in operations
is the move to “Industry 4.0” — the leveraging of interconnected systems to
increase efficiency. A core challenge in connecting Industrial Control Systems
(ICSs) to external networks is the lack of security these systems were designed
around.
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ICSs have long shelf-lives and rebuilding these systems is not often a viable
solution to improve security. Additionally, even with modern systems, the crit-
icality of industrial control systems, both economically and from a safety per-
spective, means that security needs to be watertight. For ICSs used in critical
infrastructure, the security requirement is yet more important (Gazula, 2017;
The Guardian, 2021). Unfortunately, critical infrastructure like the electric
grid stands to benefit a great deal from a radical shift in functionality. W.
Wang and Lu (2013) discuss the opportunities and challenges in Smart Grids.
While not the exact topic of this thesis, Smart Grids highlight a complex en-
ergy system that promises great advances in efficiency if the security concerns
can be assuaged.
Digital Twins promise to do exactly that. This thesis explores a framework for
Self-Learning in Digital Twins to maintain a close pairing with the physical
twin under uncertainty.
A Self-Learning system under the definition put forward in this thesis falls
under the third, sixth and seventh waves of adaption as described by Weyns
(2018), and advances goals beyond the waves insofar as handling unanticipated
change. These waves describe the evolution and interrelation of problems in
the field of self-adaptive systems. An unanticipated change in the underlying
system could have many causes, but regardless of cause, the Self-Learning
system must continue to model the underlying system faithfully to be capable
of protecting it.
The long life of industrial facilities makes mandatory a solution that can be
applied retrofit, and from machine learning to expert knowledge, Artificial
Intelligence undoubtedly plays a role in this solution. Rebuilding these plants




Self-Adaptive Systems are systems that modify themselves to adapt to changes
in their environment Weyns (2021a). In computing, software often assumes
that its environment does not change, and when it does, that a human can
adapt and evolve the software instead. Self-Adaptive Systems as applied to
software allow software-intensive systems to adapt to expected changes and
variations in their environment. As a primitive example, a server hosting many
applications may choose to devote more processing time to the application
under the most load. In more complex cases, these systems can dynamically
adjust their configurations to meet changing demands.
To achieve these forms of adaptation, many Self-Adaptive Systems use mod-
els of the underlying system. These models can be created using a range of
methods, including using domain-expert knowledge or via system identifica-
tion. Of fundamental benefit to this thesis is the ability to guarantee these
models against undesirable outcomes. Van Zijl (2020) use formal methods in
their thesis to check models of autoscaling in Cloud infrastructure. The goal
of that thesis is to guarantee a model satisfies a contractually agreed level of
service to the end-user of the infrastructure. In the same vein, energy systems
have failure states that need to be guaranteed to a variety of stakeholders, and
this goal can be achieved using the mathematical verification of models.
1.1.2 Control Theory
Weyns (2018) describes the use of control theory to achieve Self-Adaptivity as
the sixth wave of Self-Adaptation. Control theoretical approaches often make
use of mathematical models of underlying systems to create feedback loops
that drive the systems toward some goal. These provide benefits over other
solutions, such as guarantees under uncertainty and mathematical stability
checking. For safety-critical systems, these features are paramount.
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1.1.3 State-Space Models
A state-space model is a mathematical representation of a system. While
other types of model would suffice for control, this type of model is useful for
engineering self-adaptive systems as they provide a well-understood basis from
which to build upward. For the purposes of this thesis, state-space models exist
in the following discrete-time form:
x(t+ 1) = Ax(t) + Bu(t) (1.1)
Where x is the state vector representing the system at time t, u is a vector of
inputs at time t, A is a matrix that describes how the state x changes over
time, and B is a second matrix that describes how inputs affect said changes in
x. Time increments, t, advance in whole units where each unit is the reciprocal
of the sampling frequency.
|EigenV alues(A)| < 1 (1.2)
For the verification of stability in this case, the magnitude in the real and
imaginary plane of the eigenvalues of A must be below 1, as shown in Equa-
tion 1.2.
In later chapters, this thesis uses the continuous-time form x̂ = Ax + Bu as
a substitute as it allows for easy distinction between x, the current state, and
x̂, the future state.
1.1.4 Anomaly Detection
Anomaly detection is the detection of rare or out-of-distribution data. Com-
monly applied to fraud and intrusion detection (Chandola, Banerjee, & Kumar,
2009), anomaly detection takes many forms where outliers are typically prob-
lematic. This assertion is not always true, however, and some applications
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of anomaly detection are used for change detection, such as event detection.
Though digital twin technology has potential in furthering low-noise event
reporting, this thesis focuses on the drift of a system toward a new normal.
Unanticipated changes are changes that were not explicitly defined and whose
impacts can be unpredictable. While control theory can provide guarantees
of the model in use, it does not guarantee that the model matches the real
world. Handling these changes is subtly different from the common use of
anomaly detection. Some of these changes are not anomalous and are instead
an incorrect assumption in a model. Other anomalies are not harmful and
the system can continue regardless. Changes to the real-world counterpart of
these models do occur in practice in cases such as when a heat exchanger fouls
or when boiler systems wear (Wade, 1995). These degradations are expected,
but the exact impacts on the system are hard to predict.
1.2 Aims
This thesis aims to develop an adaptive digital twin for an energy system and
to forward the engineering methods and architectures of digital twins in the
process heat sector. In furtherance of the first aim, this thesis architects and
prototypes a Self-Learning and Self-Protecting digital twin using a simulated
energy system. The use of a simulated physical twin allows for rapid pro-
totyping and the testing and solicitation of further requirements. In terms
of iteration speed, stimulated energy systems hold a few key advantages over
real-world energy systems. Including, the time investment to set up a testing
environment, the speed of development, and the rate of data collection. The
learnings of the first aim are then used to rearchitect the design of this type
of digital twin and propose an engineering method for their creation.
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To reach these aims, this thesis proposes two research questions. These ques-
tions reflect the respective aim as laid out above.
RQ1. How to develop adaptive digital twins that incorporate Self-Learning and
Self-Protection in the process heat sector?
RQ2. How do the learnings of development expand the theory of Self-Adaptive
Systems for the engineering of adaptive digital twins?
1.3 Structure
This thesis is laid out as follows. Chapter 2 covers the related work including
the systematic literature around Digital Twins. Chapter 3 presents the method
this thesis uses and the questions it answers. Additionally, that chapter defines
Self-Learning in the context of this thesis. Chapter 4 describes the techniques
and experiment design in addition to the requirements of the work. Chapter 5
discusses the results of the work as they pertain to Self-Learning. Chapter 6
discusses the results of the Self-Protection methods built atop the Self-Learning
system. Chapter 7 discusses an updated design based on the lessons learned
during Chapters 5 and 6. Finally, Chapter 8 concludes the thesis, discusses its
limitations, and proposes avenues of future work.
Chapter 2
Related Work
This chapter covers the related work that surrounds the area of Self-Protecting
Digital Twins. This thesis proposes a definition of Self-Learning systems that
enables Self-Protection in a wide range of applications.
The upcoming section covers the systematic literature review that started from
an ad-hoc literature search into Digital Twins. Before that, the first section
covers Digital Twins and the working definition of Project Ahuora. Following
digital twins, the Self-Adaptive Control Systems section explains the bene-
fits of using control theory to create digital twins. Finally, the last chapter
summarises the chapter and leads to the Requirements and Design chapter.
2.1 Digital Twins
The definition used for Digital Twins until further discussion in Section 2.1.3
originates from the joint work of the National Aeronautics and Space Adminis-
tration (NASA) and the United States Air Force (USAF), in which Glaessgen
and Stargel (n.d.) lay out the groundwork for a new manufacturing, certifica-
tion, and fleet management paradigm.
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2.1.1 Digital Twins in Critical Infrastructure
While Digital Twins are still a fairly new and upcoming area of research, they
do see use in critical infrastructure. (Bécue et al., 2018) show twins in use
as tools for both automated testing and personnel training. From the afore-






• Intellectual Property Protection
They also mention that security “must be understood as an enabler” in In-
dustry 4.0 and highlight the necessity that security is included at a design
level.
Similar to Self-Protecting honeypots, digital twinning in critical infrastructure
has a relatively small pool of authors. This pool can be divided into two
subsets: cyber-ranges and intrusion detection.
Eckhart and Ekelhart (2018a) uses digital twins and state replication to detect
intrusions in industrial control systems. Unfortunately, this approach intro-
duces latency and required a reduction in PLC scan time. In industrial control,
real-time systems are a hard requirement, so adding latency to these devices is
an issue, though not an insurmountable one. Many areas of critical infrastruc-
ture operate on time frames where these lowered scan times are acceptable;
though, the impact this approach has on patching and updating plants due
to requiring the model to update is a potential issue for industry. This paper
also highlighted that it can notice an attack after the fact. For critical ICSs,
this level of security may not be high enough. It did not deal with remedy-
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ing the situation that arises from the event. Detecting a catastrophic event
post-calamity is of limited real-world use.
Eckhart and Ekelhart (2018b) also relied on detection after the fact. It also
appeared to rely on the virtual environment being hit, not physical hardware.
Eckhart, Ekelhart, and Weippl (2019) expanded on this framework and exam-
ple, bringing it into the realm of visualisation. This framework used by Eckhart
and Ekelhart (2018b) does have available code1.
Gehrmann and Gunnarsson (2020) proposed a framework for twinning an ar-
bitrary device. The solution relied on Cloud connections in their diagrams and
appeared to use a bidirectional synchronisation pattern. This solution also de-
tected vulnerabilities after the fact. In many cases, this would be too late to
sufficiently safeguard a legacy site. While this paper makes significant inroads
in terms of performance and overhead, it requires that the PLC synchronise
state with the twin at various points to guard against rogue stimuli target-
ing the physical twin. Provided these synchronisation points are sufficiently
spaced, it may be possible to toggle the PLC state to avoid detection.
An area of commonality of these solutions is the requirement to change the
PLC logic to enable state replication. These changes have potential side effects,
both in terms of execution time and stability, that may hinder their adoption.
Some industries, such as aviation, take an altogether different approach, fo-
cusing heavily on personnel training. Airbus (n.d.) and Boeing (n.d.) both
provide such cyber-range solutions to partners.
Additionally, both Airbus (ASCon Systems, 2017) and Boeing (The Boeing
Company, 2019) announced the use of Digital Twins; however, they utilise




At this time, there is little indication that the industry uses digital twinning
defensively in the real world, and even if that case does see use, it is not
widespread.
2.1.2 Digital Twins in Critical Infrastructure for Self-
Protection
Self-Protection in Critical Infrastructure is a newer area of research and is one
that is key to realising the goals of Industry 4.0. Combined with Digital Twins,
Self-Protection allows production facilities to be placed on the internet with a
high degree of security.
Unanticipated changes that seek to cause damage are, for all intents and pur-
poses, a cyber attack. Current literature focuses on machine learning ap-
proaches to address this concern; however, other avenues are under-explored.
Danny Weyns raises the issue of Self-Protection as an open challenge in Section
11.2.2.2: “Dealing with Unanticipated Change” in his book under the section
titled “Open Challenges” (Weyns, 2021a).
Self-Adaptive systems have a wider reach than solely Industrial Control System
security, and the creation of twinned, runtime models has applications rang-
ing from Smart City planning to the decarbonisation of production facilities.
These runtime models become even more potent when used to perform “What
If?” studies, as is illustrated by Schluse, Atorf, and Rossmann (2017) in their
paper that discusses using Digital Twins in conjunction with a simulator to
perform these studies. Of note is that the aforementioned paper does not use
a runtime synthesised model, and thus would struggle to handle unanticipated
changes to the modelled system.
Schroeder et al. (2021) propose a method for the creation of digital twins based
on modelling languages. Their approach describes an architecture where a
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collection of smaller components that each fulfil a goal. These components
cover many of the common features proposed in the literature but do not give
rise to Self-Protection. Since the models are built on a static model, these
twins are not adaptive and are thus unable to Self-Protect when the physical
system changes.
2.1.3 Further Definition
Prior to this section, Digital Twins were defined based on NASA’s 2010 def-
inition. While this is a useful and apt description for the overall concept, it
pays to differentiate levels of Digital Twin functionality.





It is this definition that this thesis will use herein.
Briefly, Digital Models are a standalone model built of a real-world system,
Digital Shadows are Digital Models that uses sensor data from their real-world
counterparts, and Digital Managers are Digital Shadows that feed data back
to the physical twin in the form of control. This definition is very similar to
the definition proposed in Kritzinger, Karner, Traar, Henjes, and Sihn (2018),
except that this definition refers to Managers over Twins to avoid confusion.
As a first step, this thesis proposes a method for the automatic creation of
Digital Shadows rather than Digital Twins under the above definition.
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2.2 Machine Learning
Machine learning is the use of algorithms that learn to model a system us-
ing example data. These algorithms span a wide range of subcategories from
decision tree learners to neural networks. A common feature of all machine
learning algorithms is the creation of a model that can be used for prediction,
regardless of complexity. There is an argument to be made that system identi-
fication of control-theoretical models falls under this definition. Accepting this
categorisation, these models differentiate themselves by providing guarantees.
As mentioned in Gunning (2017), machine learning is a broad field, and some
methods do support forms of verification; however, there is a negative corre-
lation between accuracy and explainability. This gap is no more evident than
in the case of deep neural networks.
2.2.1 Neural Networks
Neural Networks (NNs) are a subcategory of machine learning that use layers
of updatable biases and weights to approximate a function. While neural
networks, especially Deep Learning (LeCun, Bengio, & Hinton, 2015), have
shown exemplary performance in a range of fields in recent years, they are not
without drawbacks.
Neural networks require considerable amounts of training data to generate an
accurate model. For many applications, this demand for data is satisfiable,
but for some applications, such as those later in this thesis, it is not. There
are data augmentation techniques for improving the size of datasets, but few
apply in this case.
Another downside of neural networks is the lack of transparency or verifiability
they bring. With verifiable models, both in machine learning more generally
and in other disciplines, all possible states are known. With a neural network
26
approach, the doubt that the model may suddenly behave unexpectedly cannot
be removed. Even providing guarantees within safe ranges is prohibitively
difficult, especially in the face of malicious modification, such as the one-pixel
attack by Su, Vargas, and Sakurai (2019). This doubt presents an issue for
the adoption of such techniques in critical infrastructure and is thus an area
of active research.
2.3 Self-Adaptive Control Systems
The use of control theoretical models for the creation of digital twins is a novel
step toward the synthesis of a self-adaptive system based on the live, real-world
system.
There are other approaches to modelling systems, such as the variety of meth-
ods used in Burroughs (2021), Chew, Kumar, Patros, and Malik (2020), Pa-
tros, Kent, and Dawson (2017), Podolskiy, Patrou, Patros, Gerndt, and Kent
(2020); however, these approaches usually require an expert to define them
before runtime. For the application of automatically synthesising a system
model based on real-world sensor data, prior created models are not a feasible
approach.
There are machine learning approaches that can also learn from live data.
Stream learning is a good example of such an approach, and stream anomaly
detection techniques, like (Tan, Ting, & Liu, 2011), (Dawson, Patros, & Kent,
2021), and (Podolskiy, Mayo, Koay, Gerndt, & Patros, 2019), would work
well in a security context. Machine learning approaches, while often highly
accurate, suffer from a lack of explainability (Gunning, 2017).
This is in direct contrast to control theoretical models. Frequency response and
pole locations of control models show how the model will respond to stimuli
and how the model behaves over time.
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Work by Angelopoulos, Papadopoulos, Silva Souza, and Mylopoulos (2016)
proposes a similar Control-based Requirements-oriented Adaptation (CobRA)
method to adapt to changes of an underlying system. CobRA uses a learning
component to correct their model of the system based on measurements from
the environment. This learning component is a Kalman filter that updates to
correct the system’s understanding based on how the real system tracked.
2.4 Systematic Literature Review
This section outlines the literature review of security techniques for Critical
Infrastructure (CI). The below section will cover the techniques, the method-
ology, and the results of the review.
2.4.1 Methodology
A systematic literature review was conducted in this research. Before the
discussion of the review, it is pertinent to cover some of the decisions that
were made and influenced the findings of the review.
Firstly, the automatic portion of the literature review was conducted on Scopus
due to both Scopus’ API making mining relatively easy and to the number of
results collected.
Secondly, the automatic search did not include other papers by the same author
or papers citing the core papers when expanding its search radius. To combat
this limitation, more recent papers were prioritised.
Thirdly, the algorithm implemented to search the papers assigned a weighting
based on age and citation count in an attempt to order papers that were both
new and impactful higher than those that were either older, prominent papers
or recent, uncited papers.
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The following is the scoring equation:
Result: Sets 1.5x multiplier if Title contains “Twin”





Algorithm 1: Part 1 of Scoring for Automated Literature Review
Score = (100−(CurrentY ear−PublicationY ear))×Citations×Occurrences×Twin
(2.1)
The goal of the two equations above was to sort publications in an order that
favours recent papers that occur many times as parents or children of the initial
pool of papers or are, in general, commonly cited by other papers. It further
prioritised papers whose titles contain the Twin to push Digital Twin papers
higher.
For the systematic portion of the literature review, this thesis selected 13
papers using the following keyword searches:
• digital twin AND cyber security
• digital twin AND cyber-security
• digital twin AND cybersecurity
This thesis selected these papers based on the impact, citations, abstract,
introduction, and relevance to this thesis’ research goals as stated in Chapter
2.4. This preliminary search left a group of recent papers from which to expand
the search.
From there, the automated portion of the literature review collected the ab-
stracts and metrics of related papers and ordered them for review.
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After two expansions, the list of 539 papers was filtered by abstract.
During this process, an expansion to the search terms was necessary to capture
the research intentions of this thesis. Including the added terms, the full list
of terms was:
• digital twin AND cyber security
• digital twin AND cyber-security
• digital twin AND cybersecurity
• digital twin AND critical infrastructure
• digital twin AND critical-infrastructure
• digital twin AND process heat
This repeat yielded an additional 137 papers, bringing the total to 676 papers.
A manual search over the abstracts brought this count down to 308.
In total, fewer than 100 were not related to motivation. This total of 676 is
in line with findings by Jones, Snider, Nassehi, Yon, and Hicks (2020) that
showed only very recent widespread interest in digital twins, so it stands to
reason that there is not an overly large corpus of work.
2.4.1.1 Manual Additions
Because automatic searches may potentially miss high-value resources, the
review included some additional papers on the merits of interest or academic
relevance. This is especially true when dealing with governmental resources
from comparatively small nations, such as New Zealand, as they are unlikely
to see widespread citation outwith their country of origin.
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Examples of such additions include Lockheed-Martin’s Cyber-Kill Chain paper
(Hutchins, Cloppert, & Amin, 2011) and a paper evaluating the efficacy of
reinforcement learning in intrusion response (Iannucci, Barba, Cardellini, &
Banicescu, 2019).
A second, smaller literature pass over the following terms added additional
context:
• Self-adaptive AND digital twins
• Self-adaptive AND digital twins AND cyber
• Self-adaptive AND honeypot
2.4.2 Continuous User Training
The Government Communications Security Bureau (GCSB) suggest in Sec-
tion 7.1.7 — Detecting Information Security Incidents — of the New Zealand
Information Security Manual (GSCB, 2020) that all agencies should “imple-
ment and maintain tools and procedures covering the detection of potential
information security incidents...”. Of the items suggested to be included in
these tools and procedures, User Awareness and Training appears to be an
area of little academic research.
Karampidis, Panagiotakis, Vasilakis, Markakis, and Papadourakis (2019) found
that 70% of enterprises they surveyed did not have scheduled awareness brief-
ings. They also found that 75% do not have a traffic analysis tool, and 70% did
not have tested backups. Regardless of the reason for this trend, it shows that
a considerable number of enterprises could strengthen their security posture.
The authors postulate that Information Technology (IT) operators in the ICS
space “do not consider [the likelihood of cyber-physical attacks] seriously”.
Čeleda, Vykopal, Švábenský, and Slavı́ček (2020) proposed a training testbed
for cybersecurity students. Citing industry issues with an insufficient quantity
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of trained security personnel in the ICS space, this paper focused entirely on a
course to build skills in a workforce of security experts rather than to reinforce
the security posture of the workforce on the ground.
It is worthy of note that, unlike in other areas, Denial of Service (DOS) attacks
in ICSs are a critical-level vulnerability. If a controller is brought down, it has
a very real possibility of disrupting the entire site (Microsoft Corporation, n.d.;
Reuters, n.d.). Such attacks against PLCs can be performed with open-source
penetration testing tools, such as Metasploit (Wallace & Atkison, 2013).
While improved testing and training capability is vital for the security of in-
dustrial control systems, it’s not the only avenue that can be explored.
2.4.3 Literature Crossover
In this second, ancillary literature pass, this thesis focused on a combination
of four themes:




2.4.3.1 Honeypots, Decoys, and Deception
Self-Protecting Honeypots The first gap identified in this literature re-
view is that very little work exists in the space of Self-Protecting honeypots.
There is little existing research in this area, and what research there is written
by a small pool of authors, such as Pauna (2012) and Pauna, Bica, Pop, and
Castiglione (2019).
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One of the primary benefits brought by a Self-Protecting honeypot is the ability
to gather real-world data about how Self-Protecting fair in the wild. Addition-
ally, Self-Protecting honeypots should be able to consume extra resources from
the adversarial side.
Digitally-Twinned Honeypots Honeypots based on digital twinning is a
recent research area by extension of digital twins being, themselves, a new
field (Jones et al., 2020).
Figure 2.1: Lightwire Address tagged as ICS Honeypot in Shodan (n.d.)
Figure 2.2: Step-7 port (102) flagged as a honeypot and Modbus shows two
fake S7-200s in Shodan (n.d.)
Digital Twins provide the ability to create accurate, high-interaction honey-
pots. The benefit of such a system is the increased difficulty an adversary
would face detecting the honeypot, which alters the cost-benefit tradeoff of at-
tacking the infrastructure. Zamiri-Gourabi, Qalaei, and Azad (2019) described
the ease in which some honeypots may be fingerprinted and demonstrates the
need for reduced fingerprint-ability in deployed honeypots. This point is re-
iterated by a cursory glance — Figures 2.1 and 2.2 — on the web indexing
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platform Shodan (n.d.). Even when restricted to just New Zealand, it is rela-
tively easy to spot a Conpot (MushMush Foundation, n.d.) instance operating
on Lightwire (n.d.)’s network.
Honeypots in Critical Infrastructure Honeypots in Critical Infrastruc-
ture are not an uncommon occurrence in the literature (K. Wang, Du, Ma-
harjan, & Sun, 2017), and neither are deception campaigns. There are a few
reasons that deception makes sense in an industrial control setting.
Firstly, many systems in operation in production today are unable to use
state-of-the-art security methods. Due to the long life of infrastructure, many
plants were not built with interconnection, Cloud, or Internet of Things (IoT)
in mind. These plants, built on protocols like DNP3 and Modbus, lack any
form of security (Amoah, Camtepe, & Foo, 2016; Hayes & El-Khatib, 2013).
Secondly, honeypots can provide detailed threat intelligence about attacks in
the wild. This information can be used to strengthen areas that see high-
frequency or high-severity threats occur (Bahşi & Maennel, 2015). Deutsche
Telekom (n.d.-a) host a dashboard showing open-source intelligence (OSINT)
created from the data of both their own and community honeypots.
Honeypot Interactivity Protocols/Ports OSINT
Conpot Med 13/13 HPFeeds
GasPot (Trendmicro, 2015b) Low 1/1 None
Artillery (BinaryDefense, n.d.) Low 1/16 None
Cowrie (Oosterhof et al., n.d.) Med-High 1/1 None
Dionaea (DinoTools et al., n.d.) High 14/14 HPFeeds
T-Pot (Deutsche Telekom, n.d.-b) High 39/39 HPFeeds
Table 2.1: Non-exhaustive list of ICS Honeypots
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As an aside in Table 2.1, Conpots maintainers merged Gaspot into Conpot
in 2015 (Trendmicro, 2015a) and instances were detected via fingerprinting
in (Zamiri-Gourabi et al., 2019). Additionally, HPFeeds is an open-source
intelligence feed that is supported by a wide range of tools.
From the academic side, many papers, such as Bernieri, Conti, and Pascucci
(2019)2 or Pauna, Iacob, and Bica (2018), do not provide code with which to
reproduce results. Additionally, some papers, like Pauna et al. (2018), evaluate
on the open internet, which, while a real-world example, lacks reproducibility.
2.4.4 Key Findings
This section lays out the key findings of the literature review. In the litera-
ture, there is a significant focus given to the areas of Intrusion Detection and
Anomaly Detection (Feng, Li, & Chana, 2017; Lai, Liu, Song, Wang, & Gao,
2016; Zhou et al., 2015). The literature also appears to have an overarching
focus on the defensive side of security. This focus is justified in the findings of
Urias, Van Leeuwen, and Richardson (2012) and Green et al. (2017).
Without investment in the development of standardised testbeds and “cy-
ber ranges”, such as Gao, Peng, Jia, Dai, and Wang (2013), Bitton et al.
(2018) and Bécue et al. (2018), penetration testing is hampered significantly
by either the cost or risk when testing on in-house deployments or production
sites, respectively. Not all testbeds are equal, however, and Gao et al. (2013)
lacks actionable results. Both Bitton et al. (2018) and Bécue et al. (2018)
are stronger, but focus on how cost and the potential impact of digital twins
impact testbeds, respectively.
2Additionally, this paper arguably falls within the realm of Digital Twins
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Davis and Magrath (2013) survey cyber ranges and testbeds and categorise
them into various areas, such as testbed technology and use case. A key
finding in this paper was that many current testbeds utilise either simulation
or emulation with an overall focus on training. Another fundamental point
raised was the implementation and monetary cost associated with large scale
deployments of these testbeds.
Holm, Karresand, Vidström, and Westring (2015) also surveyed testbeds in-
tending to answer four research questions. In their survey of 30 Industrial
Control System (ICS) testbeds, 16 had vulnerability analysis as their key ob-
jective. Education and the evaluation of defence mechanisms ranked joint
second with nine testbeds a piece. Another finding from this paper is that
only 11 testbeds in this study attempt to verify fidelity with only four being
based on standards.
2.5 Research Gaps
The following items were identified as research gaps in the literature review:
• Self-Protecting Digital Twins
• Testing Methodology for ICS Systems
• Framework for Fidelity Analysis of ICS testbeds (Holm et al., 2015)
• Automated Security Testing using twinned CPSs
• Hardware-directed decoys or twins
• A scalable, digitally twinned cyber-range
Additionally, Asghar, Hu, and Zeadally (2019) state that current ICS security
solutions carry a high cost, both in terms of implementation and maintenance
cost. For this reason, this thesis begins by discussing an approach to enabling
internet connectivity of industrial control facilities aided by Self-Protecting
Digital Twins.
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Figure 2.3: Simplified Gap Analysis
A Digital Twin capable of Self-Protection and Self-Healing can tackle some of
the key areas of future research raised by the aforementioned paper, such as
reduced implementation time and increased adaptability under uncertainty.
2.6 Conclusion
In summary, there are many avenues of research still to be fully explored in the
area of Digital Twins. This thesis focuses on their uses in the Self-Protection
of dynamic energy systems.
One of the challenges of Digital Twins for Self-Protection is maintaining an ac-
curate model of the physical twin when said system is subject to change. Weyns
(2021b) envisions the use of learning techniques, such as Bayesian networks or
Machine Learning, to keep runtime control models up-to-date in response to
uncertainty. In response, this thesis describes a Self-Learning framework that
aims to dynamically maintain an accurate, within defined tolerances, model
required for such Self-Protection.
Chapter 3
Research Method
From the gaps in the literature highlighted in Chapter 2, this thesis started by
conceptualising a Digital Twin-enabled Cloud-Machine Interface (CMI). This
interface creates a human-in-the-loop system that leverages the Digital Twin
paradigm and lessen the attack surface. A barrier to using Cloud computing
to optimise plant efficiency is the possible attack surface that connecting a
plant to the internet exposes. By running “What If?” tests on the digital twin
and passing the updated state to a human operator, the CMI aims to reduce
the risk of compromise for twinned infrastructure.
Figure 3.1 depicts this proposed concept of a CMI that uses digital twins
as a method of validating the legitimacy of data received from the Cloud.
Using control theoretical approaches to digital twins provides guarantees and
explainability, both of which are necessary for Industrial Control.
In Figure 3.1, the connection that the CMI uses to interface with the Human-
Machine Interface (HMI) has an electric disconnect to allow the HMI to isolate
the network at any moment. The CMI interfaces with a read-only network
splice to retrieve live system data, with the HMI to send vetted suggestions,
and with the Cloud to retrieve suggestions. The digital twins perform “What
If?” tests on optimisations from the Cloud to ensure safe operation.
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Figure 3.1: Cloud-Machine Interface
In this interface, no Cloud optimisation suggestion is deployed directly. The
digital twin vets the suggestions before presenting them to the human operator
for the final decision.
This chapter outlines the research questions that this thesis tackles, the def-
initions used in achieving those ends, and how the experiments and systems
function. To the best of the knowledge of this thesis, the Self-Learning archi-
tecture presented herein is a novel contribution.
3.1 Self-Learning and Self-Protection
The definition of Self-Learning in the context of Self-Adaptive Systems is only
vaguely defined. Machine Learning aptly describes the above cases, and in fact,
many use techniques well regarded to fall under that umbrella, such as neural
networks and genetic algorithms. Self-Learning, in the context of a system
that adapts to its environment, should be able to adapt to said environment.
The above mentioned approaches are trained once at creation and do not
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adapt; instead, Self-Learning is used to denote a system that learns without
external aid. In common machine learning parlance, this class of approaches
are referred to as unsupervised learning (Ghahramani, 2004).
Instead, this thesis posits a framework for creating Self-Learning systems that
learn from and adapt to their environments. A framework for a generic system
such as this Self-Learning system should also be generic. To those ends, this
thesis argues for the definition of Self-Learning as a system of the following
components: the monitoring component, the modelling component, the verifi-
cation component, the imagining component, the falsification component, and
the reconsidering component. These components enable for the substitution
of implements of each module while retaining the overall Self-Learning nature.
This thesis’ solution involves fully re-identifying the model to incorporate fun-
damental changes that were unanticipated at design time. This is in contrast to
CoBRA that, as mentioned in Section 2.3, builds a Kalman filter to transform
and adapt to the data it reads from the system.
Figure 3.2: Proposed Self-Learning Architecture
These additional terms are defined below and their interrelation is depicted
in Figure 3.2. The implementations of these terms depend on the underlying
techniques that constitute the overall system.
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The Monitoring Module provides the system the ability to monitor its sur-
roundings. In this thesis’ case, it is the ability of a digital twin to read live
data from its physical twin.
The second module — the Modelling Module — provides the system the
ability to generate a model of the physical twin based solely on inputs and
state of that twin. This property draws an analogy to the ability to formulate
beliefs based on observations. There are a plethora of ways to attain this
property. Many of the aforementioned papers implement unique modelling
techniques, and in fact, almost all techniques under the umbrella of Machine
Learning should fit this bill.
As part of this modelling, the system needs to be capable of verification, pro-
vided by the Verification Module. The ability of a system to verify itself is
necessary to ensure that the model is stable and correct. For control theo-
retical systems, there exist defined verification techniques, such as frequency
response plots and pole plots. Some Machine Learning algorithms, such as
decision tree learners, can be audited, but even these lack guarantees on sta-
bility. An example of pole plots showing stability is depicted in Figure 3.3.
The three poles in this figure have a distance of slightly less than one, which
means the system will slowly converge.
Determining model correctness is, at least partially, domain-specific. For ex-
ample, in the area of process-heat, a model that describes a change in internal
energy without energy entering or exiting the system violates the first law of
thermodynamics. For some domains, the aforementioned sanity check may not
be feasible. Another example is whether the model is logically consistent.
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Much like a human using their knowledge of a subject to estimate “What
If?” scenarios, the Imagining Module relates to the capability of a system
to imagine a future state based on forecasted inputs. The imagining module
also covers such a system’s ability to produce said forecasted inputs through
a variety of substitutive means. In this thesis’ case, the forecasting is handled
by one of two oracles as covered later in Section 4.1.3. These oracles allow the
system to see future states and ask limited “What If?” questions.
Figure 3.3: Three Pole Plot for DMDc model
The Falsification Module, alternatively the Validation module, allows the
system to determine how far from reality an imagined value is after reality
reaches that point. It is the ability to realise that the beliefs, which are the
predictions in this case, one holds are incorrect. If where the system imagined
itself to be is sufficiently different from where it ended up, the system needs to
reevaluate its beliefs. As this definition pertains to digital twins, it refers to the
ability of the digital twin to compare its imagined values to the physical twin’s
true values. Continuing from the prior example on the imagining module, the
system then gets an answer to the “What If?” question.
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In the below figure, solid lines represent the control flow and dotted lines
represent data flow.
Figure 3.4: Implemented Self-Learning Diagram
Finally, the Reevaluation Module provides a system’s ability to update its
model based on how the system progressed in reality. This state only occurs
if the system was previously falsified. As depicted in Figure 3.2, a model that
does not support a partial update may instead recreate itself. The reevaluation
module may choose not to update a model in cases such as the new model
failing non-functional requirements.
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As shown in Figure 3.4, part of the duty of the Monitoring component is to
read sensor data from the system — the simulator — and update the stored
history. The Monitoring Module then passes control flow to the Falsification
Module.
The Falsification Module first requests predictions from the Imagining Module,
then it compares the predictions to ground truth from the knowledge store.
The falsification data is then passed to the Reevaluation Module.
The Reevaluation Module checks if the Model was falsified and whether the
model should be retrained. Some other considerations in this module are
restricting the module from retraining the model too often, especially if re-
training has a high cost. When training a new model, the control is passed
on to the Modelling Module; otherwise, control is returned to the Falsification
Module. In the event that control is returned to the Falsification Module, it
then calls on the Self-Protection Module.
If the control flows to the Modelling Module, said module handles fully or
partially updating a copy of the model, depending on what the Reevaluation
Module decided was necessary. Once the copy of the model of the system is
updated, the module passes it to the Verification Module for verification.
The Verification Module verifies the model, and if it passes verification, com-
mits it to the knowledge store. Upon a verification failure, the control flow
returns to the Modelling Module to resolve potential issues. In this thesis,
verification and feedback were human-in-the-loop designs that required man-
ual intervention. The experiments in Chapter 5 and Chapter 6 do not wait
for the human-in-the-loop to act and simply continue regardless, though the
latter chapter does discuss automatically reacting.
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Lastly, the Self-Protection Module handles preventing the real system from
venturing into these states. In this thesis, this module engages to prevent the
system from exceeding 100°C. Section 6.3 discusses the states in further detail.
Figure 3.5: Self-Learning Framework Class Diagram
Figure 3.5 shows an example class diagram for Self-Learning. Where applica-
ble, the classes shown in the figure do not include the “Self-” prefix in their
class names. Of note in this diagram is the SystemModel class. SystemModel
is an interface that any implementation of a model must implement to be
compatible with the Modelling Module.
These classes are minimal: they do not try to cover every possible end-use.
Instead, they provide a starting point from which to build additional function-
ality, such as model adjustment. The diagram depicts Self-Protection without
member variables or methods as it lies outwith the scope of Self-Learning.
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3.2 Hypotheses
Before moving on to cover the research questions in further sections, there are
a few terms that need defining in the context of digital twins. The first term
this thesis defines is Self-Learning as it is a precursor to both Self-Protection
and Self-Healing in digital twins.
Other research uses the term Self-Learning in many different ways. In Al–
Habaibeh and Gindy (2001), the authors use automated sensor and signal
processing to create a self-learning system to detect degradation and failure
of machining equipment. The application of self-learning in that paper is in
determining which sensors are most representative of a fault. The use case of
that paper is similar to the case laid out later in this chapter; however, the
key difference is that this thesis’ approach focuses on enabling a digital twin
that can handle unanticipated changes of the physical twin.
Zhao et al. (2021) use Self-Learning to refer to a system that learns which
parts of its training data hold the most relevance. The training is conducted
on real-world data, as per a Digital Shadow, but it is only run during a training
phase and is not a continuous process.
Indeed, the use of Self-Learning to refer to an algorithm that learns without ex-
pert knowledge is fairly common. Both of the above examples appear to fit this
classification, and so do Oliveira-Neto, Han, and Jeong (2013), Jang (1992),
and Wei et al. (2021). Peng Wen, Zhang Dianhua, and Gong Dianyao (2012)
uses the term to represent an online, proportional control strategy guided by
mass-flow equations.
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As Self-Learning is a precursory challenge to Self-Protection, this thesis needs
to ascertain a fit-for-purpose Self-Learning architecture before moving on to
Self-Protection. As such, this thesis plans to answer the following research
questions:
H1. Is the proposed software architecture for Self-Learning Systems fit-for-
purpose?
H2. Are the proposed Self-Learning algorithms fit-for-purpose as applied to
Dynamical Energy Systems?
H3. Assuming adequate Self-Learning, are the proposed Self-Protection al-
gorithms fit-for-purpose?
3.3 Summary
In summary, this thesis focuses on fit-for-purpose Self-Learning methodologies
and algorithms. A fundamental part of the aforementioned definition of Self-
Learning is being able to update the model in use. As Filieri et al. (2017)
mentions in their Section 5 subheading “Automatic synthesis and update of
controllers”, the ability to dynamically create and update models at run time





This section covers the requirements and design of the simulator, the oracles,
and the experiments. For the reproduction of results, where applicable and
when not otherwise stated, all randomness is pseudorandom and the seed shall
be zero (0).
4.1 Simulation
To test both the first and second research question, this thesis uses a water
heating simulation written in Python 3. Without a real-world boiler to model
nor a built simulator for these experiments, this thesis builds a water heater
rather than a boiler due to the equations used being faster to implement.
Overall, this choice should not alter the validity of the findings as the proposed
framework is not implementation-specific.
The simulation makes use of a deterministic random number generator (RNG),
meaning that runs with a given seed value always progress identically, which
allows for direct comparisons between Self-Learning and Self-Protection strate-
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gies. Additionally, the simulator runs at a fixed 100-hertz internal rate, and
the test harness samples the system at 0.1 hertz.
Although the simulation is not overly true to real-world industrial boilers —
boiling is considered a failure state by the simulation — it does allow testing
hypotheses, which is what is important in this context.
The design of the heater is detailed in the following sections.
4.1.1 Heater
The first component of the simulation is the heater itself. The heater consists
of a water tank, a heating element, an inflow pipe, and an outflow pipe.
Figure 4.1: Modelled Water Heater
In all tests, the tank is configured as having an upper limit of 75 litres and a
minimum of five litres. The heating element is relatively large for the amount
of water at 20,000 watts. The size of the heating element gives the heater fast
dynamics and creates a need for a good twinning solution. Many boilers in
the energy sector have slower dynamics than this heater, so provided a Digital
Twin can be synthesised for the heater, it should apply to slow systems.
While the Digital Twin of this heater should generalise to slower systems, some
pertinent assumptions are listed. First, the water in the heater mixes perfectly.
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While not true on short time scales, water does mix over longer time scales,
and these long scale trends will amortise. Second, the Twin has complete
visibility to both the internal state and the inputs of the heater, which is
not always true in real-world applications. As discussed in Section 4.1.2, this
implementation does change which input and state values are exposed, but
that does not completely mitigate this limitation.
On the note, Table 4.1 depicts the variables of the heater.
Inputs and Outputs Internal State
Water Inflow Rate Water Volume
Inflow Temperature Water Temperature
Water Outflow Rate Heater Maximum Power
– Heater Output Level
Table 4.1: Raw Heater Variables
The simulation uses the same seeded RNG to influence the inflow and outflow
rates. The logic for water inflow is simplistic: if and only if the tank is not full,
water can flow. Water outflow is equally simplistic with the only difference
being that it checks that the tank is not empty. Despite the simplicity, the
simulation does
The boiler updates its temperature using the following equations:
AvgHeat =
Tw ∗ Vw + Ti ∗ Vi
Vw + Vi
(4.1)
where Tw and Vw are the temperature and volume of water in the tank, and





where Hp is the heaters maximum power, Hc is the heater output level, and
Vw is the water volume in the tank.
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In the below algorithm, HeatLoss is a small amount of lost temperature.
Result: Temperature and Volume are updated
Volume -= OutFlow * 0.5
Temperature = AvgHeat + HeatGain - HeatLoss
Volume -= OutFlow * 0.5
Volume += InFlow
Algorithm 2: On Tick Boiler Update
In Algorithm 2, the Volume is modified by OutF low both before and after
the temperature update. The reason for this is that in-flowing water, InF low,
is already computed analytically, and so should be handled after the update,
where out-flowing water is not, and thus splitting it into two helps avoid biasing
the update due to sample timing.
4.1.2 PID Controller
A proportional-integral-derivative (PID) controller handles the heater output
level. This controller is tuned by hand and is far from perfect, adding further
challenge and motivation to the Self-Protection use case. Figure 4.2 depicts
how this PID controller is implemented in respect to the water heater.
Inputs and Outputs Internal State
Water Inflow Rate Water Volume
Inflow Temperature Water Temperature
Water Outflow Rate Heater Output
Target Temperature –
Table 4.2: PID + Heater Variables
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The effect of the PID controller is that the boiler is that there is now an
additional input variable — the PID’s target temperature. The internal state
also shrinks with HeaterMaximumPower and HeaterOutputLevel becoming
a single value representing the current operating power in watts.
Figure 4.2: Heater Diagram with PID
The values in Table 4.2 are used by all twinning techniques in the comings
chapters. The change to monitored variables should better reflect real-world
scenarios, even if these are still fairly best-case examples.
4.1.3 Forecast Oracles
The implementation of the simulator uses two forecast oracles. The first of
these oracles, as depicted in the lower graph of Figure 4.4 by the first of two
coloured bars, is a perfect representation of the future. As seen in the upper
graph, the simulator is running ahead of the twin, which provides the first
oracle window with a perfectly accurate set of future inputs. In this window,
the only variable is the model in use as the forecasted values are perfect.
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Figure 4.3: Evolution of the heater over time
In the second oracle, the last value of the first oracle is replicated over the entire
window. This oracle emulates a poorly performing forecasting algorithm. The
benefit of using a constant value over the window is that it shows the temporal
dynamics of the model in use.
From the perspective of the model, the oracles both represent future values.
The oracles only provide the input and output data, and the model must
propagate the state correctly to predict future trends. This thesis only runs
the simulator in the future to provide ground-truth values.
Figure 4.4 uses a Dynamic Mode Decomposition with Control (DMDc) model
that shows good temporal dynamics and resistance to poor forecasting. As a
note, this thesis does not cover the use of forecasting algorithms, but they do
form an integral part of real-world implementation.
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Figure 4.4: Simulated Heater Graphs
4.1.4 Error Metrics
A secondary benefit of the simulator running in the future is that the error can
be computed at various points over the first oracle’s window. In the results
section, all results pertaining to model error use the error over a single time
step.
As shown in Figure 4.5, the error over oracles of various lengths remains rel-
atively constant. This figure measures the error of each step rather than the
accumulated error. The tighter the 95th percentile confidence interval — de-
picted in blue — and the flatter the line, the better the model is handling state
propagation. In this case, DMDc was the model in use.
This graph is the aggregate of a sliding window of results rather than stochastic
predictions against a fixed ground truth. For this reason, these graphs are
representative of the initial 10,240 seconds of the simulation. More graphs
showing error over the oracle window appear in Chapter 6.
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Figure 4.5: Error over the first oracle’s window (n=2048)
4.1.5 Degradation
As an operative question in this thesis is to adapt to unanticipated changes
in the underlying system, the heater degrades over time. It does so in several
ways:
Firstly, the heater’s maximum power degrades over time. When this degra-
dation starts and how long it takes to reach maximum degradation are both
randomly selected from a Gaussian distribution added to a constant.
Secondly, the interpolation rate of the heater in response to the PID controller
slows, leading to longer dynamics over time. Both the time to start and the
onset time are selected the same way as above. This lag time exists to simulate
a heating element that cannot immediately change in power level, such as gas-
fired boilers.
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The simulation allows a maximum of 60% degradation. When the power degra-
dation causes the heater to be incapable of reaching the target, the DMDc
model becomes highly inaccurate. This inaccuracy does cause a retrain that
solves the issue, but it affects the graph scale. This particular case is inter-
esting as it does show the retraining working. In the tests conducted in this
thesis, the heater reaches full degradation at approximately 248,550 seconds.
The instability occurs considerably after said point, as shown in Figure 4.6,
and produces warnings relating to numeric stability of the matrices.
With the graph scale ranging so drastically, it becomes hard to pick out small-
scale inaccuracies in the model. Considering that the degradation of the heater
is still a large, unanticipated change, this thesis limits degradation to 60% —
an 8,000-watt maximum output power. This is sufficient to demonstrate the
Self-Learning properties of the system.
Figure 4.6: Numeric Explosion with DMDc when Heater degrades to 95%
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4.2 Tested Techniques
This thesis evaluates several techniques against the heater defined in Sec-
tion 4.1. Each technique is discussed in detail below. Some techniques are
not tested and will be discussed in the limitations section.
Before moving to definitions, this thesis defines an axis of conformity for each
of the six attributes. Monitorability, Modellability, Verifiability, Falsifiability
are binary. Either the system supports it, or it does not. For both Imagin-
ability and Reevaluability, any given system can have either full, partial, or no
conformity. Imaginability can have partial conformity in the form of a system
that can only predict the future using state data without factoring in input
and output data. Reevaluability can also have partial conformity insofar as
partially conforming systems do not support partial updates to models and
instead require recreating the model.
The reason that Imaginability has partial conformity is that a model that does
not use input and output data cannot perform “What If?” experiments where
the question revolves around changes to inputs or outputs.
Table 4.3 depicts the techniques as they sit in terms of conformity.
4.2.1 Base-Case
The Base-Case technique assumes that the state at time t will be identical
to t − 1. This technique does not make any use of input or output state
information and is therefore only partially capable of Imagining.
As this technique does not create a model, it is incapable of Modelling, Veri-
fication, and Reevaluation.
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Figure 4.7: Overshoot with Same-Trend technique
4.2.2 Same-Trend
The Same-Trend technique assumes that the state at time t will be as follows:
t = (t− 1) + ((t− 1)− (t− 2)) (4.3)
This technique offers surprisingly good accuracy due to the long response times
and high linearity of the system; however, it does suffer from overshooting in
long-range predictions, as shown below.
In Figure 4.7, the physical twin has plateaued from close to 100°C down to
the target temperature of 95°C, while the digital twin predicts it would have
dropped to around 90°C. At the end of the long-range forecast, this tech-
nique predicts close to 85°C. If the physical twin were allowed to continue, it
would drop slightly below 95°C before trending back towards it. The Same-
Trend technique causes this behaviour by being unaware of the PID driving
the physical twin.
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4.2.3 Observer Kalman and Eigensystem Realisation
The Observer Kalman Identification (OKID) (Juang, Phan, Horta, & Long-
man, 1993) and Eigensystem Realisation Algorithm (ERA) (Juang & Pappa,
1985) technique — known herein as OKID + ERA— uses the two namesake al-
gorithms to create a state-space model of the system. This thesis implements
this technique by creating many models and ranking them with a heuristic
function to determine the best. The process of creating multiple models gen-
erates twenty models, of which only around ten are valid, and the heuristic
function is a simple count of the number of stable poles.
OKID + ERA fully conforms to Monitorability, Verifiability, and Imaginability
as it creates a model. It does not support partial model updates, however, and
therefore partially conforms to Reevaluability.
Of issue with OKID + ERA is the inability to model the PID controller in-
volved in the simulation. Where the two techniques described below are both
capable of modelling an underlying controller as evidenced by the “with Con-
trol” suffix, OKID + ERA is not, and that leads to significant error.
4.2.4 Dynamic Mode Decomposition with Control
The Dynamic Mode Decomposition with Control (DMDc) (Proctor, Brunton,
& Kutz, 2016) algorithm creates a state-space model that encapsulates un-
derlying controllers, such as the PID controller in the simulation. As DMDc
creates a state-space model, it covers the same conformity as OKID + ERA.
Demo, Tezzele, and Rozza (2018) wrote the DMDc implementation used in
this thesis.
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4.2.5 Sparse Identification of Nonlinear Dynamics with
Control
The Sparse Identification of Nonlinear Dynamics with Control (SINDYc) (Brun-
ton, Proctor, & Kutz, 2016) does not build a state-space model and therefore
does not naively meet the Verifiability requirement. Given SINDYc’s construc-
tion, verification is possible.
De Silva et al. (2020) wrote the SINDYc implementation used in this thesis.
4.2.6 Recurrent Neural Network
Using Tensorflow (Martı́n Abadi et al., 2015), this thesis implements a recur-
rent neural network based on two, 1024-cell LSTM (Hochreiter & Schmidhu-
ber, 1997) layers with dropout followed by two dense layers. The first dense
layer has 256 neurons, and the second is the output layer that produces the
predicted state.
Networks, in general, support Monitorability, Imaginability, and full Reevalu-
ability. That is to say that they can model a system, imagine future states
based on inputs and outputs, and both partially and fully recreate the afore-
mentioned model.
Where networks fall short is in Verifiability. As shown in Gunning (2017),
explainability in Artificial Intelligence is negatively correlated with predictive
accuracy. While networks perform well, they lack explainability, and without
explainability, it is exceeding challenging to mathematically prove stability
and correctness.
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As an aside, this thesis ran experiments using Tensorflow 2.2.0, which does
not support weight updates after serialisation; however, Tensorflow 2.4.0 and
greater do support it. This limitation does not prevent proving the concept
but does preclude running tests in this configuration as tests occur after seri-
alisation.
4.3 Conclusion
In conclusion, this thesis proposes a redefinition of Self-Learning that includes
six core attributes. To the best of this thesis’ knowledge, no current definition
of such a system that can adapt to unanticipated changes exists. A more in-
depth discussion of stability measures is featured in the results chapters for
supported models.
As depicted in Table 4.3, few current techniques have the requirements of a
Self-Learning system. It should be noted that this table omits Monitorability
and Falsifiability as the test harness implements these requirements.
Technique Modelling Verification Imagining Evaluation
Base-Case – – Partial –
Same-Trend – – Partial –
OKID + ERA Yes Yes Full Partial
DMDc Yes Yes Full Partial
SINDy Yes Yes1 Full Partial
Recurrent Network Yes – Full Full
Table 4.3: Techniques and Self-Learning coverage
For state-space models, such as OKID + ERA and DMDc, there exist sup-
plementary techniques to allow full conformity in Reevaluability. These tech-




This chapter discusses the efficacy of proposed Self-Learning algorithms and
the retraining of system models. The inputs and outputs of the system —
shown in Table 4.2 — along with the creation of an ancillary data, such as
matrices, are described in the prior chapter.
For completeness, all test iterations used an Intel® Core™ i7-8700 and an
NVIDIA® GeForce® GTX 1050 Ti. In terms of software, all tests used Python
3.8.
Do note that this thesis only performs experiments once, unless otherwise
stated, as the simulator is deterministic and produces the same results every
time. This determinism also applies in terms of different hardware: better
hardware will only complete the experiments faster.
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5.1 Performance over Simulation
In this section, this thesis tests retraining as used in Self-Learning. To achieve
retraining, this thesis uses four falsification strategies: time-based, absolute
error-based, signed error-based, and step error-based.
The time-based strategy uses the passage of time since the last successful
retraining to determine if the model has become stale. Although this strategy
could be dynamic, this thesis enforces a retraining every six simulated hours.
The absolute error-based strategy accumulates the magnitude of the system’s
error. This value always increases in the presence of error until the retraining
threshold is reached. This thesis sets this threshold at 200 as it performed well
in testing.
In contrast with the above strategy, the signed error-based strategy accumu-
lates the error while respecting its direction, leading to some errors cancelling
out. Because error can cancel itself out, this strategy has a comparatively low
threshold of 100 when compared with the absolute error strategy. The thresh-
old for this approach should be below the absolute error threshold otherwise
it will never be reached; however, the exact value chosen by this thesis has
no special relation to absolute error and a half of that metrics threshold was
merely convenient and performant.
Finally, the step-based error strategy only considers if the last prediction was
sufficiently far from the actual values. This strategy exists to quickly bail from
wildly inaccurate models. This thesis sets the threshold for this strategy at
two as it only triggers when the weighted error for a single step is large.
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When evaluating the error, a multiplicative weighting — depicted in Table 5.1
— is applied to the delta between the true and predicted values before the
Self-Falsifying implementation decides on falsification. Weighting the values
emphasises the primary predictive attribute used in Self-Protection. Errors in
Heater Output Power are not as valuable for falsification as the range of values





Table 5.1: Variable Weighting
As the Base-Case and Same-Trend do not feature retraining, those results will
not be in Table 5.3 below and are instead listed in Table 5.2.
Error Type Base Follow
Temperature 3320.3 1126.7
Water Level 399.33 581.47
Power 7366.1 175.33
Table 5.2: Error for non-retraining models
The graphs below use the total accumulated error. Even though the simulator
resets the tracked error, the accumulated error remains the same.
Do note that Table 5.4 is not complete and similar values between Table 5.3
removed for brevity. A complete version of this table is available in the Ap-
pendix Table 8.1. For all removed OKID values, they shared an error of 2.45e9
rather than 2.37e9.
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Strategy DMDc OKID SINDYc
No Retraining 5622.5 1.36e9 3320.3
Step 5622.5 2.37e9 3320.3
Signed 2890.8 2.34e9 3320.3
Sign., Step 2552.5 2.37e9 3320.3
Absolute 2692.9 2.37e9 3320.3
Abs., Step 2624.1 2.37e9 3320.3
Abs., Sign. 2675.9 2.37e9 3320.3
Abs., Sign., Step 2629.5 2.37e9 3320.3
Time 2804.9 2.92e9 3320.3
Time, Step 2668.8 2.37e9 3320.3
Time, Sign. 2693.3 2.34e9 3320.3
Time, Sign., Step 2604.3 2.37e9 3320.3
Time, Abs. 2760.6 2.37e9 3320.3
Time, Abs., Step 2585.7 2.37e9 3320.3
Time, Abs., Sign. 2698.6 2.37e9 3320.3
All 2573.0 2.37e9 3320.3
Table 5.3: Temperature Error Across All Retraining Strategies
5.1.1 Retraining
Note that the recurrent neural network results are omitted from many tests due
to poor performance after retraining. In part, this performance is likely due
to insufficient training data being present during retraining. When retraining,
the neural network has access to the last 1300 steps of history, and it segments
this dataset further into a 9:1 split for training and testing data. Without
more data, the recurrent neural network is unable to completely retrain and





Sign., Step 2877.8 2.45e9
Absolute 2699.0 2.45e9
Abs., Step 2629.4 2.45e9
Abs., Sign. 2683.4 2.45e9
Abs., Sign., Step 2636.1 2.45e9
Time, Sign. 2742.7 2.45e9
Time, Sign., Step 2610.1 2.45e9
Time, Abs. 2766.7 2.45e9
Time, Abs., Step 2591.1 2.45e9
Time, Abs., Sign. 2706.1 2.45e9
All 2610.1 2.45e9
Table 5.4: Temperature Error Across All Retraining Strategies with minimum
time before retrain
The rest of this subsection covers how this thesis handled retraining for DMDc.
To measure retraining stability, this thesis uses a mix of visual metrics, such as
the below Principal Component Analysis (PCA) graphs, and comparisons of
retraining strategies. Tables 5.5 and 5.6 demonstrate the amount of a change
seen by the DMDc matrices during retraining. For both tables, the rows rep-
resent input data and the columns represent the impact on the state variables
as a result of x̂ = Ax + Bu where x̂ is the new state, A is the discrete-time
state matrix and B is the discrete-time transition matrix.
Given that the degradation of the system applies mostly to the heater power,
the largest changes being those that modified the power state lines up. The
two changing components of the underlying system are the heater power and
interpolation rate degrading. Both of these components directly affect the
dynamics of the internal power variable.
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— Temperature Water Level Power
Temperature 0.00154 0.00138 1.04
Water Level 1.10 0.899 19.7
Power 0.0000181 0.0000101 0.00934
Table 5.5: Total Change in DMDc A Matrix (Three Significant Figures)
— Temperature Water Level Power
In Flow Rate 0.0690 0.155 2.54
In Flow Temperature 0.00148 0.00197 0.271
Target Temperature 1.50 1.23 25.1
Out Flow Rate 0.120 0.0416 17.8
Table 5.6: Total Change in DMDc B Matrix (Three Significant Figures)
For example, the widest difference for DMDc in Table 5.4 is from the No
Retraining entry at 5622.5 to the Signed strategy entry at 2545.3. This result
shows that retraining, in this instance, can reduce error by 54.7% in the best-
recorded case. On average, the reduction falls to 48.9%, including both Step-
based only cases where the improvement was 0.0%. Excluding those cases
gives a reduction of 52.3%.
The Step-based strategy is not useless, however, and aids the Signed strategy
in Table 5.3. Interestingly, this does not apply to Table 5.4. The helping is
further illustrated in Figure 5.1 where the Step strategy causes some of the
largest changes in A matrix values. In this figure, the size of the bars — both
those at the bottom and those on the line — represents the magnitude of the
change in the A matrix.
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Figure 5.1: Signed Error with Absolute A Matrix Difference over time
To visualise how the A and B matrices for DMDc changed, this thesis performs
PCA on said matrices and demonstrates the clustering that occurs during the
end of the portion of the test runs in Figure 5.3. This area lines up with a
trough shown in Figure 5.2. The equivalent absolute change graph and the
visualisation for the B matrix is shown in Appendix Figures 8.1 and 8.2.
In all of the 3D figures, the scale to the left of the vanishing point ranges from
0 to 120.
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Figure 5.2: Absolute change in A matrix values between retraining
The index of each point is represented by a coloured dot that ranges from
green to red where green is the lower indices and red, the higher. In both
cases, the PCA visualisations show a clustering late on in the data. While the
final few points of both cases show a trend away from the cluster, note that the
graph scale on that axis is 1e−16. Additionally, Appendix Figure 8.5 shows
the result of a longer run. This run encompassed eight times the duration
and shows a similar result. The graph is not identical because the longer run
enforced a minimum time between retraining while the initial run did not.
This thesis also performed tests using the best performing retraining strategy,
the Signed strategy. These images have been omitted because they show is
largely identical to the more frequently retrained runs. The difference being
that the Signed strategy only meaningfully retrained at the beginning of the
run when the underlying system was changing and not after the system reached
steady-state. This trend is shown in Appendix Figure 8.7.
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Figure 5.3: Principal Component Analysis of A matrix change over time
The aforementioned PCA visualisations show the PCA of the difference be-
tween each matrix after each retraining. Figure 8.8 shows the PCA of the
A matrices themselves over an octuple length run. In this visualisation, the
model converges on a small region after only a few iterations after changing
fairly drastically over the beginning iterations, which lines up with the retrain-
ing magnitudes in Appendix Figure 8.9.
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Figure 5.4: Principal Component Analysis of A matrix over time
5.1.2 Model Stability
In the framework outlined in the previous chapter, Self-Verification checks
the model for correctness and stability. In this thesis, the verification step
involves a human in the loop and does not check for correctness. Additionally,
verification was only implemented for the DMDc model.
The human-in-the-loop can validate the model stability by checking pole place-
ment and comparing the bode plots to the dominant frequencies in the input
and output data. Figure 3.3 shows the pole placement graph for DMDc with
a 0.1 Hz sampling rate. Figure 5.5 shows the magnitude half of the bode plot
and the phase plot can be found in Appendix Figure 8.10. Both figures follow
the same layout as Table 5.6.
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Figure 5.5: DMDc First Retrain Bode Plot — Magnitude
In Figure 5.5, there is a peak in magnitude of frequency response around
0.0001 Hz. In no cases do higher, non-aliased frequencies cause spurious spikes
in response, and given that the dominant frequencies in the simulator reside
at or around 0.00015 Hz, the model should be resistant to higher-frequency
manipulation. The implications of this resilience and these results are discussed
in the next chapter — Chapter 6.
As already mentioned in Chapter 3, another model stability check is pole
location, and as depicted in Figure 3.3, which is of the same DMDc system as
this discussion uses, the poles lie within a unit circle and are thus stable and
converging.
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5.2 Performance over Varying Oracle Depths
A discussion on the fitness-for-purpose of Self-Learning algorithms would be
incomplete without also covering the ability to imagine future states. As such,
this thesis touches on this in this section. To do so, this section presents three
tabular summaries of the errors over a perfect oracle using multiple modelling
techniques. For each table, the name of the best solution is bold, as are the
individual best error mean and variance metrics. Unlike in Section 5.1, the
following experiments used oracle depths greater than one, where a depth of
one is, in effect, not an oracle.
The OKID and ERA model is omitted from these results as it generated a
mean error of 7.4592e60. As mentioned in Section 4.2.3, this result is not
unexpected. The inability to model the controller causes significant drift from
the ground truth, and this drift is accumulated over the entire oracle.
Figure 5.6: Error mean and deviation over the primary oracle (25th retrain)
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These metrics represent area under the means and deviations — as shown in
Figure 5.6 or earlier in Figure 4.5 — respectively. The data in this figure are
shown as “DMDc 25” in the below tables. In Tables 5.7, 5.8, and 5.9, Integral
Error represents the total area under the mean line, and Integral Error Variance
represents the total area between the mean and two standard deviations. For
integral values, lower is better.




DMDc 0 271.81 295.12
DMDc 1 53.228 897.46
DMDc 2 34.106 994.42
DMDc 10 16.645 334.39
DMDc 25 1.9841 296.28
Recurrent 365.65 963.35
Table 5.7: Temperature Error (Five Significant Figures)
As in Figure 4.5, each technique listed below used 2048 samples for every one
of the 150 steps into oracle. Each technique is tested with identical input and
ground-truth data.
When considering the best solution of each table, this thesis adds the error
variance to the mean twice and uses the lowest result. This result represents
the total area contained within the 95th percentiles in the above-mentioned
figures.
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Note that the SINDYc and the base case have identical results. This is not
a mistake: the test runs in question are repeatable and continue to yield
identical results. Instead, it is due to the implementation of SINDYc seemingly
modelling the same dynamics as the base case. The results here form a trend
that continues in later results.




DMDc 0 280.37 454.11
DMDc 1 0.76662 17.031
DMDc 2 0.24930 17.914
DMDc 10 1.6035 33.936
DMDc 25 1.4677 26.190
Recurrent 50.112 17.035
Table 5.8: Water Level Error (Five Significant Figures)
The reason for the uneven progression of retrained DMDc state-space models
is that each represents a different period of the simulation state. These periods
are well depicted in Figure 5.1. The majority of the DMDc values depicted in
the three tables mentioned above are from the initial period where the state-
space model changes significantly. Model 25 occurs shortly into the stable
region and is the third model that was triggered by the time-based strategy.
This stable region is also visible as the cluster of Figure 5.3.
For Self-Protection, the most important state variable is the temperature, as
this variable has a defined failure state. As shown in Table 5.7, DMDc model
25 performs the best in temperature error despite having neither the lowest
integral error nor the lowest integral error variance.
75




DMDc 0 101.10 1355.3
DMDc 1 366.24 9975.0
DMDc 2 335.97 10099
DMDc 10 352.22 4242.0
DMDc 25 17.711 1327.4
Recurrent 3590.5 1822.4
Table 5.9: Power Error (Five Significant Figures)
Note in these results the comparatively high performance of the base case
and SINDYc. In all three variables, these two techniques performed the best
in integral error and well in integral error variance, being close to the best
performer in that metric as well. This result is likely due to the dynamics
being slow enough that changes between samples are minor.
5.3 Conclusion
In conclusion, the results in this chapter present a compelling argument for the
fitness-for-purpose of the framework laid out in Chapter 3 and the algorithms
used in this chapter as applied to dynamic energy systems.
In testing the Falsification and Evaluation modules, this chapter has shown the
performance benefits of retraining control models with a range of thresholds.
Without retraining, the prebuilt DMDc model would have been unable to
model the changing dynamics of the system. Without multiple strategies, the
retraining may have been too sparse or too frequent to provide benefit, as
evidenced by the difference between the rows of Table 5.3.
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The ability to check model stability is a boon of using control theory, and
as such, this chapter covered a rudimentarily implementated of Verification
module. Despite the human-in-the-loop nature of this module, the system
could be automated.
Finally, this chapter explored the ability of the tested digital shadow to Self-
Imagine. This sufficiently accurate imagination allows the system to predict





This chapter covers Self-Protection and input frequency handling. This thesis
implements both of these features as human-in-the-loop interactions; there-
fore, discussions of automated actions are reserved for Section 8.3.5 under
Future Work. The automated actions that do occur in the below sections are
rudimentary but serve as an example from which to build atop in the future.
The first experiment covers the case where an input causes the system to enter
a failure state. In 1982, a Siberian gas pipeline exploded as a result of a cyber-
attack that caused over-pressurisation. This attack involved resetting pump
speeds to maintain flow rates greater than the controller intended, leading
to a failure of the physical pipeline (Gazula, 2017). While there are benefits
in connecting plants to the internet, it is cases such as these that show why
detecting and preventing dangerous trends in a system is required.
The second experiment covers the need to detect trends that degrade a system
without directly leading to failure. Motivated by the same cause as the first
experiment, the second analyses the frequencies of input and output data and
how that data influences the system. The motivation for this experiment is
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the infamous case of Stuxnet. In 2010, the Iranian nuclear reactor at Natanz
suffered damage to its centrifuges caused by excessive oscillations in speed.
The cause of these oscillations was a computer worm named Stuxnet (Gazula,
2017). While the centrifuges were not directly put into failure state as per the
Siberian pipeline case, the oscillations in speed did nevertheless cause damage.
Because the digital shadow of the simulator is capable of Self-Learning, dis-
turbances arising from the system are minimised and the impacts of both of
these experiments are isolated from underlying changes in the system.
In previous tests and as mentioned in Section 4.1.3, the simulator ran ahead of
the real predictions to provide true input and output data as if the forecasting
were perfect. A problem arises, however, in the event that control actions
need to be performed since the simulator has already processed beyond the
time step for which the control arrived. To handle this issue, while retaining
the accurate input and output data, the simulator recomputes future states
every time a control action is taken. In essence, the simulator becomes able to
time travel. When a control signal arrives, the simulator reverts time to the
appropriate time step, applies the action, and returns back to the future from
whence it came.
The impact being that for experiments in this section, an external component
can modify the system. In practice, the time travel invalidates the future data
and the simulator builds a new history that encompasses any changes resulting
from the external influence.
6.1 Signal Processing
Before discussing the Self-Protection techniques, this thesis introduces the con-




In signal processing, the Nyquist frequency is the frequency above which signal
aliasing occurs in an input signal. It is defined as one half the frequency of the
sampling rate. Provided the highest frequency in a given input signal is below
the Nyquist frequency, it is free from aliasing. An example of this aliasing is
covered in Section 6.2. There are some cases, discussed in Chapter 8, where a
signal can be reconstructed with fewer samples.
6.1.2 Transforms
The two transforms used in this thesis are the Chirp Z-Transform (CZT)
and the Fast-Fourier Transform (FFT). Note that both of these methods are
discrete-time transforms as the systems in this thesis are in discrete-time.
The Chirp Z-Transform takes a time-domain signal and expresses it in the
frequency domain. It is a more general form of the aforementioned FFT that
makes a very similar transform. The CZT can be used to compute pole lo-
cations and the region of convergence of a transfer function (Shilling, 1972);
however, this thesis did not complete the computation of the latter for the
input data, so the FFT alone would have been sufficient.
6.2 Sampling and Command Frequency
The sampling rate for the simulation is 0.2 hertz. Whilst the sampling rate is
customisable, this chapter uses one sample every five simulated seconds. Due
to an oversight in designing the simulator, the command rate is currently fixed
to the sampling rate. The import of this limitation makes it worth mentioning
ahead of the two Self-Protection methods as it affects them both.
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For the first method, the limitation means that any actions taken, such as
moving the target temperature, are processed once per five seconds. Largely,
this limitation does not adversely interfere with the protection technique.
Figure 6.1: Example of an aliased signal
However, the second method is impacted more. The inability to issue com-
mands faster than the sample rate limits the ability to create oscillations above
the aliasing limit of the sampling rate with meaning. It is possible to feed a
higher frequency signal into the system, but as the aliasing in issuing com-
mands occurs at the exact time as in sampling the system, it is somewhat
meaningless as a signal above the Nyquist frequency is aliased by definition,
and as such, no longer controls the system as intended.
Figure 6.1 shows the impacts of an aliased signal. The upper diagram shows
the raw signal with red crosses showing the sampling points at one-fifth the
frequency. The upper signal is oscillating at five times the Nyquist frequency
of the sampling rate. The lower diagram shows the reconstructed waveform,
and it is this signal that the simulator can read. The issue with the command
frequency being limited to the bottom diagram’s sampling frequency is that it
is impossible to issue commands that achieve the upper diagrams oscillations.
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For this system where the sampling rate is 0.2 hertz, the Nyquist frequency is
0.1 hertz.
6.3 Heater Failure Conditions
In the heater system, there are three internal variables with temperature being
the only variable that can result in a failure that Self-Protection can affect.
For water level, the heater implements “hardware” high- and low-level cutoffs.
If the water reaches the high-level alarm, the inlet valve is instantly closed.
If the water reaches the low-level aram, the outlet valve is instantly closed.
In both cases, the valves return to normal operation when the cutoffs are no
longer in effect.
For heater power, it is possible that the boiler sufficiently degrades — as is
mentioned in Section 4.1.5 — or outright fails. Since this variable is the main
control axis, if it is uncontrollable, then the entire system is uncontrollable:
a heater without sufficient energy entering will be unable to reach the target
temperature. The only possible action to take in such a scenario is to warn a
human operator.
In the case of temperature, allowing the water to reach 100°C would be con-
sidered a failure mode. The simulator has three ways of modifying the tem-
perature by way of modifying the heater. The first is changing the PID target
temperature; the second, the heater level; and the third, the raw heater output.
In the experiments below, without intervention, the water temperature would
reach a failure at around 3200 seconds due to the PID controller being slightly
modified from the one used in Chapter 5. This chapter doubles the PID’s
integral weighting as otherwise the temperature grazes, but does not exceed,
100°C.
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6.4 Temperature Prediction Handling
This section discusses the only automated portion of Self-Protection tested
in this thesis. The Temperature Prediction method works by predicting the
future using both oracles mentioned in Section 4.1.3. Both of these oracles
predict 15 steps for a total of 30 steps or 150 seconds. As mentioned in that
section, the first oracle has perfect information and the second assumes no
changes to the inputs or outputs in the system. Both oracles are used in full
when accumulating a variable referred to herein as the limiter. This variable
is used by each method to limit the heater and prevent it from exceeding the
maximum safe temperature.
When the end of the second oracle exceeds the safe maximum temperature,
the simulation increases the limiter by 32. Additionally, for every predicted
step where the temperature exceeds the safe maximum, the simulator further
increments the limiter. When no prediction exceeds the safe maximum, the
variable decays by 10% every step. This decaying is visible in Figure 6.2,
where the target temperature interpolates back to the set temperature. This
smoothed response is present in all methods but is most evident here. The
amount the limiter is increased by is arbitrary, and the response it causes
is further modified by the methods. For example, the PID method scales
the limiter by two when reducing the target temperature, but the heater level
method uses the same limiter variable to reduce the heater’s output in hundred-
watt increments.
The first two methods have an almost functionally identical outcome: both
cause the heater to reduce output while respecting relevant delays. Setting the
PID target to zero will quickly produce a zero heater level, but the reaction
will be delayed by the PID in addition to the delay in the heating element
acting normally and could lead to a reaction that is too slow to prevent failure.
Although the simulated version of this method — shown in Figure 6.2 — reacts
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Figure 6.2: Self-Protection by modifying PID target
fast enough. Directly modifying the heater level is an effective way of reducing
the heater power, and it bypasses the PID delay while remaining true to the
simulation.
Lastly, modifying the heater output directly is only useful for one situation:
modelling an emergency stop. Cutting off the heater immediately has no
delay period but also no controllability. When allowed more granularity than
a binary on-off, this method — as depicted in Figure 6.3 — behaves much like
the aforementioned heater level method minus the delay.
In the case of the PID, the temperature levels off at the target temperature
of 95°C, whereas with both the heater level and the raw heater output, the
levelling off occurs above the target temperature. The former method achieves
the target temperature better in this case as the Self-Protection component
is modifying, by proxy of briefly moving the target, the PID controllers state.
The other two methods modify the underlying system and leave the PID con-
troller unmodified. It will eventually converge on the target temperature, but
the modified integral weighting makes this process take some time.
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Figure 6.3: Self-Protection by modifying raw heater output
It should be noted that the Self-Protection shown in this section is a proof-of-
concept to validate the proposed design. The results are not meant to prescribe
how Self-Protection should be implemented, merely what it may look like. As
mentioned above, the methods are basic: they use what is in effect an untuned
integral controller, but they do still prevent the system from exceeding safe
limits. Additionally, due to the sampling frequency, it is not possible to only
measure the system in flight. One measurement could be sufficiently far away
from failure to satisfy a check, only for the system to encounter failure before
the next reading occurs.
6.5 Input Frequency Handling
The second form of Self-Protection implemented is the input frequency han-
dling experiment. This type of protection is aimed at oscillating changes to
the system’s target temperature. By quickly moving the set target, the sys-
tem may itself oscillate in a way that would cause damage, and although this
85
example system is not affected in terms of degradation by repeated changes,
others are. In this experiment, the oscillation moves the target temperature
between 25 and 125 degrees at 0.05 hertz.
This experiment generates a graph of magnitude and phase for the input and
output data. Because retraining may modify the B matrix, the graph data is
the product of the B matrix and inputs, as given in Equation 6.1 as an array
of B̂ vectors, where B is the B matrix, u is each input-output vector, and B̂
is each resulting vector.
B̂ = B · u (6.1)
The array of B̂ vectors then undergoes a Chirp Z-transform (Rabiner, Schafer,
& Rader, 1969) into the frequency-domain. The magnitude and the phase of
the frequency-domain data create Figures 6.4 and 6.5. The magnitude graphs
have been omitted for brevity as the disturbances as easier to spot in the phase
plot.
Figure 6.4: Phase diagram for tank temperature
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The primary differences between Figure 6.4 and Figure 6.5 is the expected
spike around 0.03 hertz to around 0.05 hertz. These are the phase graphs, so
there isn’t much to analyse here aside from where the oscillation frequencies
sit. This thesis detects these frequencies using a human-in-the-loop design,
though automating the process is possible. Analysing a known-good signal
for a ground-truth would provide enough context to determine anomalous fre-
quencies, especially if only frequencies that cause instability in the model need
considering.
Figure 6.5: Phase diagram for tank temperature with interference
Detection is but one half of protection a system, however. The protection
component works by removing frequencies within a range. In this case, that
range is 0.035 to 0.055 hertz. To remove the range, the simulation converts the
input data from the heater into the frequency domain and sets the frequencies
within the range to zero before transforming back to the time domain. To
remain consistent with the z-transform performed to detect the frequency, the
removal function transforms the data using Equation 6.1 before removing the
frequencies. The data cannot be immediately returned as it is still in B̂ form;
however, the original data format can be restored by reapplying Equation 6.1
with the inverse of B, B−1.
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Figure 6.6 shows the effects of this transform. Both sides of the graph in the
frequency domain are symmetrical, so the positive frequencies are omitted.
As mentioned in Section 5.1.2, the dominant frequencies of this heater reside
at around 0.00015 hertz, which shows as a comparatively tall spike centred
around zero. In the left portion of the figure is another, smaller peak at 0.05
hertz that disappears in the right portion. The presence of the oscillating
frequency also causes minor distortions that are most noticeable between the
two peaks.
Figure 6.6: Heater Level of B̂ in frequency-domain showing oscillations (left)
and filtered frequencies (right)
This section does not modify the input and output signals generated for use
in the heater directly, so no accuracy results can be provided as this method
is not applying anything to the underlying system. In an ideal world, it would
be, but for now, that is left as future work and is discussed in Section 8.3.
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6.6 Conclusion
The Self-Protection methods outlined in this chapter are somewhat basic but
provide a starting point for further research. Firstly, the prediction Self-
Protection method demonstrates a proof-of-concept fail-safe for use with Digi-
tal Twins. Even in a contrived and primitive form, the system handled failure
cases and kept the system under control. The oracles used in Self-Protection
can predict further into the future than the 150 seconds. The accuracy of an
increased oracle size was shown earlier in Figure 5.6, and it relevant due to
the non-linear accuracy across the window. For example with DMDc, if the
window length increased from 150 to 300, a linear increase would cause the
95th percentiles to double. In the aforementioned figure, this scaling does not
occur, and the 95th percentiles fall short of doubling.
Secondly, the frequency filtering Self-Protection method discusses the use of
input filtering for improving the resilience of the system. As mentioned above,
the inability to apply filtering to the underlying system limits any conclusions
that can be drawn about the efficacy of this method for that purpose, though
the filtering does clean up the signal as expect and so should be applicable.
Interestingly, the oscillations introduced in Section 6.5 have an adverse impact
on the functionality of Section 6.4. The oscillations cause the prediction to
momentarily exceed 100°C, which spuriously triggers the Self-Protection mech-
anisms. In actuality, the system continues with only minor fluctuations in the
heater level. Because the filtering technique is applied before the predictions
are computed, the removal of these frequencies stabilises the predictions and
removes the spurious activations.
Chapter 7
Engineering Design Discussion
This chapter discusses some of the shortcomings of the design of both the
simulator and the overall Self-Learning architecture and proposes further en-
gineering design methodologies going forward. These updated architectural
designs are based on the limitations of and the lessons learned from the cre-
ated system in this thesis. Note that this chapter only discusses architectural
limitations that are relevant to the future development of digital twins. Further
discussion of more general, out-of-scope limitations is saved for the Section 8.2.
7.1 Simulation
The use of a simulator in this thesis serves as an efficient and highly effective
prototyping tool. For Self-Learning systems, rapid prototyping is a valuable
tool as building a Self-Learning system is deeply involved. Doubly so when fac-
toring in the complexity in configuring a real-world steam boiler for this task.
Depending on the exact requirements of each physical twin, certain methods
may be unsatisfactory. A robust simulator allows the methods and overall
implementation of the Self-Learning system to be tested before attempting to
twin a real-world system.
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The benefit here is that twinning a real-world system is far from trivial. Not
only does testing on a real energy system, whether a boiler or an automotive
engine, burn fossil fuels, it can also result in the downtime of the system.
Each iteration of the Self-Learning system may require additional operation
and downtime, something that is unlikely to be granted in a production envi-
ronment.
Furthermore, for Self-Protecting systems, the state the physical twin must be
in to cause a self-protection event is inherently risky, and the uncertainty of the
system or the implementation makes this proposition doubly so. To deal with
this risk, the physical twin would need isolation and rigorous risk assessment
before each test, in addition to code correctness validation.
These challenges slow the creation of self-learning digital twins to the extreme.
By contrast, simulators enable much faster iteration and the ability to test in a
safe environment. They do add an additional threat to their validity insofar as
a twin of a simulator can only be as accurate as the simulator, but nonetheless,
they allow that testing and validation be carried out in a safe environment.
From a design standpoint, a simulator used in the creation of digital twins
benefits from the ability to “time travel”. In Chapter 6, this thesis mentioned
that the simulator was extended to enable the simulator to both generate future
data for the first forecast oracle and to act in the present, and by acting in the
present, to change said future data. In Chapter 6, this extension involved the
simulator being able to restore past states and recompute the future. While
the implementation used in this thesis was not efficient, the algorithm itself is
as the Self-Protection system seldom acts on every sample. For the majority of
samples, the system observes and only incurs any computation penalty when
it must act. This design further enhances the performance of the simulator.
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7.1.1 Simulation Design Limitations
The simulator, as implemented in this thesis, has several limitations due to the
nature of its ad-hoc construction. None of these limitations affect the results of
the thesis and serve instead to make further development harder. This section
addresses these limitations
The simulator was built around the core concept that it would be modelled by
a digital shadow. Largely, the design functioned in that regard; however, limi-
tations become more apparent when adding Self-Learning and Self-Protection
features.
The simulator referred to in the prior chapters is actually two subsystems that
operate together: the engine system that manages the registered components
and handles advancing time, and the heater simulation module that registers
with the engine and handles heating virtual water. A core premise of this
design was allowing multiple components to pass data between each other,
and although this functionality is not used in the thesis, it is used in the
improved design.
Firstly, the simulation module should be split apart as, as it stands, it is
a monolithic design that encompasses too many responsibilities. Chiefly, it
handles not just the dynamics but also the generation of disturbances and
input data. This design became a considerable obstacle for Self-Protection in
conjunction with the inability to save the simulator state, as discussed later.
Self-Protection must be able to influence input and output data to function.
As the simulation module sits very deep in the overall architecture and acts
immediately on the generated inputs, it was not feasible to modify it without
redesigning the system.
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A better approach is to create a second module — the disturbance module —
that computes input and output data with an API sufficient to modify how
input and output data look before the simulation module acts on that data.
Secondly, the system should gracefully save its state and should be able to pre-
dict future states without impacting the current state. The simulation module
does not support either, but Python’s pickle utility can work around this limi-
tation. Because pickle serialises the entire object, however, it makes influencing
input and output data impossible as it would be immediately overridden by
the object being deserialised during a rollback.
The final change to the design would be explicit support for modification. Some
supporting functions support modifying the system by calling user-defined
functions. These functions allow for rapid prototyping beyond that of using
an inherited model of simulator alone and extending this functionality to the
entire system doubles down on this flexibility.
The limitations aside, however, the simulator enabled this thesis to conduct
the work of the previous two chapters. Connecting to and actuating a physical
energy system is a complex endeavour, and one best left for future work where
resources are less constrained.
7.2 Overall Architectures
The lessons of the past two chapters identified a series of changes to the archi-
tectures of Self-Learning and Self-Protection. Additionally, there are further
changes to how the requirements of the system are elicited. Before moving on
to discuss the changes in the architectures, this section covers the requirement
changes.
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The use of simulation in this thesis enabled the rapid prototyping to elicit
further requirements of Self-Learning and Self-Protection. Due to the time in-
vestment required to get a physical energy system operational for these exper-
iments, and the inevitable scheduling issues that occur with a shared resource,
the use of a simulator allowed for an implementation that was iteratively tested
during development. Without a simulator, the difficulty of this iterative test-
ing would slow to an extreme. Additionally, the simulator can host future
optimisation experiments without impacting the running energy system. Note
that these experiments refer to testing other configurations of adaptive digital
twins and not process optimisations that would ideally be tested on the digital
twin itself.
Furthermore, the simulator allows for exploratory dives into the requirements
of the system. Initial requirements for Self-Learning were considered when this
thesis architected and implemented the simulator; however, iteration is a vital
step in developing software designs, and the inability to test quickly would have
hindered that. During the prototyping and testing of the simulator with both
Self-Learning and Self-Protecting, this thesis proposes additional requirements
that are addressed in the updated architectures.
Figure 7.1: Updated Architecture as per Figure 3.2
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Figure 7.1 shows an updated overall self-adaptive system architecture for Self-
Learning and Self-Protecting adaptive digital twins. The Reflection module
between Self-Learning and Self-Protection is a meta-control module that en-
ables further adaption at a Self-Learning and Self-Protection configuration
level. For example, the reflection module could switch the implementation of
the modelling module if the overall system is not performing well.
From here on in, this section leverages the lessons learned in the prior chap-
ters and proposes updated, fit-for-purpose Self-Learning and Self-Protection
architectures.
7.2.1 Self-Learning
The Self-Learning framework remains largely the same, but for clarity, Self-
Protection is removed from the diagram. Self-Protection is its own bespoke
subsystem, and its presence detracts from the presentation of the core idea:
Self-Learning.
In the amended Figure 7.2, the Monitoring module is a bespoke subsystem that
reads from the physical twin. This decoupling helps facilitate the solution for
the limitation raised in Section 6.2. By making the Self-Learning system —
for which the Monitoring module is the entry point — a separate system, the
locked sampling rate issue disappears by design. A second and potentially
more impactful benefit is that this decoupled system mirrors the real-world
design goals of Digital Twin-based Cloud Machine Interface.
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Figure 7.2: Self-Learning Architecture
In contrast to the implementation in Chapter 5 where the physical system
drove the Self-Learning modules in synchrony. The design in this section
is not synchronous with the physical twin, which mirrors what a real-world
implementation would necessarily be.
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7.2.2 Self-Protection
The architecture for Self-Protection is not discussed in detail in Chapter 3. So
instead of refining the Self-Protection design, this section proposes a general
Self-Protection architecture in Figure 7.3. This architecture builds on CoBRA,
as mentioned in Section 2.3, with regards to the filter stack on the physical
twin’s target and sensor data. This stack can contain any arbitrary number
of filters, including none. As in CoBRA, this stack could include a Kalman
filter, or as in Section 6.5, it could include a frequency filter.
Additionally, Self-Protection in the form shown in Section 6.4 is split into two
components, including a second stack of modifiers. As with the previous stack,
these modifiers are executed sequentially by the Protection module, which then
updates input filters or engages protection actions in physical twin.
In difference from the implementation in Chapter 6, the Protection module
is now a bespoke entity that sits decoupled from the physical twin and the
Self-Learning system, though it does rely on the model from the Self-Learning
system.
7.3 Software Development Process
This thesis posits the following software engineering process for the devel-
opment of adaptive digital twins. Firstly, the data that can reasonably be
collected from the physical twin should be identified including how frequently
this data is available, how reliable it is, and what form it takes. The monitoring
implementation requires this information if it is to be successful.
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Figure 7.3: Self-Protection Architecture
Secondly, the simulation of the system should be constructed that mirrors the
physical twin. At the same time, effort into preparing the physical system for
twinning can begin in parallel. This step enables the software development
process to begin in earnest. This thesis assumes that both preparation and
iteration time for the physical system are slower than that of the simulation.
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The software process can iterate in the design and implementation of the mod-
ules put forth in Figures 7.2 and 7.3 based on the simulation. This process
acknowledges that the simulation is unlikely to be perfect or to capture the
complexity of the physical system in full, but it does allow for the bulk of the
software development process to occur where without it, this process would
not. Essentially, this process enables the rapid prototyping and timely devel-
opment of adaptive digital twins.
Figure 7.4: Software Development Process Diagram
When the physical is prepared to be twinned, offline data collection should be
captured and introduced as a testing dataset for the in-development digital
twin. From here, the digital twin’s Self-Learning component can process real-
world data as it would in deployment. The Self-Protection module does still
require the simulator at this stage in development, however, as it cannot modify
the future of the replayed data.
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When the Self-Learning component is considered stable, it can begin to twin
the physical system. As this component cannot modify the physical twin,
beginning twinning with only that component active carries minimal risk.
In short, Figure 7.4 details the above process visually.
7.4 Conclusions
This chapter concludes the discussion of the design of the simulator and the
Self-Learning and Self-Protection frameworks. In the case of the simulator,
the benefits of using a rapid prototyping platform outweigh the potential neg-
atives. In both Self-Learning and Self-Protection, the updated designs refine
the concept and address limitations found during this thesis at a design level.
Furthermore, as mentioned in Section 7.2, the use of simulations to proto-
type and rapidly ascertain and refine missed requirements prove to be a useful








Table 7.1: Summary of Modules and Implementations
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As shown in Table 7.1, many implementations were ad-hoc or manual. Only
the reevaluation and modelling modules were tested in an interchangeable
form. The monitoring and falsifying modules were not changed because they
are closely matched to the system rather than the technique. For a different
simulator or for a real system, these modules would need to change. The
imagining and verification modules were not tested as both lie outwith the
scope of this thesis and are left as future work.
Table 7.2 below shows three example implementations for four of the modules.
The examples methods for implementing the monitoring and the reevaluation
have been omitted as both depend on external variables. The monitoring mod-
ule implementation depends on the system being twinned and the reevaluation
module implementation depends on the modelling module implementation.
These are examples as this thesis only investigated the efficacy of a variety of
modelling implementations as shown in Section 4.2.
Falsifying Imagining Modelling Verification
Threshold Same-Trend System Ident, Pole Placement
Adaptive Threshold State-Space Domain Expert Domain Expert
Machine Learning (ML) ML ML Model Checking
Table 7.2: Summary of Example Implementations of Each Module
Chapter 8
Conclusion
Realising reduced greenhouse gas emissions from the energy-intensive process
heat sector requires retrofit solutions. While replacing existing energy sys-
tems is not economically viable, improving operational efficiency provides an
immediate benefit on the road to furthering renewable energy systems.
Energy systems, among other critical infrastructure, are prime targets for moti-
vated and sophisticated cyberattacks. To leverage Cloud computing in the op-
timisation of energy system operations, security challenges must be addressed.
The usage of Cloud computing, and the serious flexibility it provides, depends
on building robust and safe systems.
In Chapter 3, this thesis conceptualised a Cloud-Machine Interface for connect-
ing the Cloud to industrial plants. Digital Twins played a pivotal role in this
interface as they provide a robust and provable model with which to test Cloud
optimisation suggestions. To handle unanticipated changes or model inaccu-
racy, Digital Twins require Self-Learning properties, and it is these properties
for which this thesis proposes and tests a definition.
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8.1 Research Hypotheses
In Section 3.2, this thesis asked three hypotheses in furthering the definition
of Self-Learning. These hypotheses are restated below.
H1. Is the proposed software architecture for Self-Learning Systems fit-for-
purpose?
H2. Are the proposed Self-Learning algorithms fit-for-purpose as applied to
Dynamical Energy Systems?
H3. Assuming adequate Self-Learning, are the proposed Self-Protection al-
gorithms fit-for-purpose?
8.1.1 Hypothesis 1
In furthering Research Question 2, Hypothesis 1 discusses the engineering
design of adaptive digital twins. This hypothesis asks what a fit-for-purpose
architecture for Self-Learning systems looks like. To answer this question, a
definition of fitness-for-purpose in this context needs discussion. Through this
lens, a system is fit-for-purpose if it can adapt to unanticipated changes in
a system that it is modelling. The framework described, implemented and
evaluated in answering Hypothesis 2 in Section 8.1.2 shows a system that fits
this description; however, it lacks refinement.
An improved version of the engineering design is discussed in Chapter 7. There
are two main points of import in that design: the use of simulated energy
systems, and the compartmentalised adaptive digital twin framework. The use
of simulated energy systems allows for the rapid prototyping of adaptive digital
twin designs to close in the optimal configuration before applying it to a real
system. This approach cuts down the iteration time, reduces risk, and vitally,
allows preparations of the real energy system to continue in parallel with design
considerations. Secondly, the use of a compartmentalised framework allows
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for easily substituted components. For cases where safety criticality is not a
high-priority factor, machine learning techniques could stand-in for the control
theoretical techniques used in Chapters 5 and 6.
In summary, the answering of Hypothesis 1 contributes to Research Question 2
and the second aim of this thesis. The design discussion in Chapter 7 posits an
approach to the development of adaptive digital twins that furthers the theory
of self-adaptive systems as used in digital twins. This method is not intended
to be an authoritative solution; instead, it is proposed as a single, possible
avenue that can excel in some cases and falter in others. In the same vein, as
there are myriad sorting algorithms where the best for a given use case can
be chosen, this thesis contributes an algorithm for the development of digital
twins.
8.1.2 Hypothesis 2
Fitness-for-purpose in the context of Hypothesis 2 is the ability to adapt to
reasonably conceivable real-world changes in the physical energy system. For
reference, this thesis’ energy system was a heater system that degraded in
terms of the maximum heater output and the speed of heater output change.
The digital shadow created in Chapter 5 followed the Self-Learning method-
ology laid out in Section 3.1. In testing, this model-based digital shadow was
able to consistently model the physical system more accurately than the base
case that assumed nothing changed. The test case that assumed the system
continued to move in the derivative direction did outperform the modelled
techniques in temperature error. For the avoidance of doubt, it also at least
matched the modelled techniques in water level error and beat them in heater
output power.
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The reason for the “Same-Trend” technique performing as well as it did is
discussed later in Section 8.2.1. To summarise, the experiments are conducted
with a single step into the future, which benefits techniques that perform well
in short term predictions, such as the “Same-Trend” technique. Longer-term
prediction leans more heavily on the ability to model a system, and this leaning
is highlighted in Section 5.2. Additionally, the “Same-Trend” approach falls
short in Self-Protection as discussed in the next hypothesis.
The techniques used in Chapter 5 demonstrate the foundations of fit-for-
purpose Self-Learning algorithms and methodologies as applied to dynamical
energy systems and contribute to Research Question 1. As the physical sys-
tem degrades and its dynamics change, the techniques in the aforementioned
chapter adapt to the changes and continue to accurately model the system.
8.1.3 Hypothesis 3
Fit-for-purpose Self-Protection algorithms and methodologies are techniques
that use Self-Learning to handle situations that could cause damage to the
physical hardware. In Chapter 6, this thesis demonstrated two example meth-
ods of Self-Protection for energy systems.
The first technique, predicting the future and avoiding failure cases, uses the
oracles to a greater extent. The limitation discussed at the end of Section 8.2.1
needs addressing before additional work on this technique can be evaluated in
a more grounded manner. This limitation is addressed in Section 8.3.4, and
a second piece of future work — Section 8.3.7 — rounds out the final addi-
tion required to gather comparable metrics. In this method’s current form,
it has shown the promise and the ability of various modelling techniques in
handling failure cases but lacks objective data to prove each techniques rela-
tive efficacy. Notably, Dynamic Mode Decomposition with Control (DMDc)
performed better than the “Same-Trend” case mentioned in the discussion
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of the above hypothesis as that technique’s accuracy varies wildly when the
prediction is sufficiently far into the future.
The input frequency filtering technique in Section 6.5 generates frequency data
over the history of the digital shadow and removes select frequencies. In the
tested implementation in this thesis requires a human to select these frequen-
cies; however, this implementation is sufficient for showing that removing fre-
quencies from the input signal can be beneficial. There was a decrease in
overall model accuracy with a filtered signal compared to the unmodified sig-
nal; however, the modified oscillating signal causes a drastic increase in error
and causes the first Self-Protection to trigger fail-safes spuriously. It should
be noted that the decrease in model accuracy with a filtered signal is likely
caused by the oscillating signal still affecting the heater but no longer affecting
the Modelling process, which would cause the Modelling process to, in essence,
be acting in inaccurate data from the start.
In summary, the two proposed Self-Protection techniques show promise when
based on the ability of a Digital Shadow to learn and adapt to unanticipated
changes in the physical twin. Answering this hypothesis contributes to Re-
search Question 1, and in combination with Hypothesis 2, answers it.
8.2 Threats to Validity
This thesis addresses the limitations in its discussions in this section. The
limitations are grouped by the category they impact.
8.2.1 Simulator
One major limitation of the methods tested was the lack of testing with
batched, non-neural-network approaches, such as decision trees, or stream
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learning algorithms. Offering these techniques in addition to those provided in
Section 4.2 renders a more complete answer to the efficacy of the Self-Learning
framework.
Batch learning models like decision trees are explainable. Whilst the exact
level of explainability depends, among other factors, on the size of the tree,
it is possible to enumerate and check all possible outcomes. Do note that the
models referred to here are not bagged or boosted as these techniques reduce
their explainability (Gunning, 2017). Decision trees, such as the type proposed
by Liang, Zhang, and Song (2010), also perform well in terms of retraining and
updating speed.
Stream Learning has a concept called “Concept Drift” (Gama, Žliobaitė, Bifet,
Pechenizkiy, & Bouchachia, 2014). Concept drift is a movement in the underly-
ing system being modelled. The implementation of retraining in Section 5.1.1
bearing a similarity to concept drift is no accident: Concept drift satisfies the
Self-Learning requirement of Falsifiability. In many ways, stream learners sat-
isfy a large portion of the Self-Learning framework and, as such, are excellent
testing candidates, excluding, of course, the difficulty of proving guarantees
and stability.
Another limitation in the simulation portion of this thesis is the deviation from
real-world process heat energy systems. In real-world boilers, water is heated
past its boiling point to raise steam, and this difference changes a considerable
amount in terms of the dynamics of the physical system. For one, the failure
states of a boiler are different from those of a heater. Secondly, a boiler has
non-linear dynamics compared to the heater’s linear dynamics. Although these
differences exist, the toy example of a heater demonstrates the Self-Learning
framework for linear systems at the very least.
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A further limitation in this portion of the thesis is the length of the oracles
generated in Section 5.1. In this section, all evaluations of error were carried
out by comparing the simulation to the model as it stepped forward in time
without using any oracle data. In essence, these comparisons occurred at
an oracle depth of one, and while there is a good reason for doing so, it
gives an advantage to some techniques over others. The reasons for using
this oracle depth is to eliminate the effects of the oracle from the results and
because in real-world situations, only the first prediction would be comparable
to the physical system for retraining. The downside of this depth is that some
techniques, such as DMDc, perform comparatively better with deeper oracles,
at least in temperature and water level predictions.
Lastly, the simulator is responsible for generating the input and output data
it uses. This lack of separation causes an issue that is discussed above in
Section 8.1.3 whereby the simulator is not affected by the impacts of filter-
ing select frequencies from the system. The want to solve this limitation is
mentioned in Section 8.3.6.
8.2.2 Sampling
As mentioned in Section 6.2, the current implementation of the simulator locks
the control action rate to the sampling rate and vice versa. As a result, it is
not possible to test the detection of higher frequency inputs or the impacts of
allowing state updates more frequently than those updates can issue control
actions. Disconnecting these rates would provide additional data points for
heterogeneously sampled systems, though it is likely only to affect the Fre-
quency Self-Protection method. A more complete analysis of the benefits of
this approach is discussed in the aforementioned section.
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Secondly, the Frequency Self-Protection method discusses the use of input
filtering for improving the resilience of the system. As mentioned in Section 6.5,
the inability to apply filtering to the underlying system limits any conclusions
that can be drawn about the efficacy of this method for that purpose, and
though the filtering does clean up the signal, the system’s stability remains to
be more thoroughly tested.
8.2.3 Data Types
This thesis uses exclusively numeric data. It is worth noting as the finding
within this thesis may not apply directly to categorical applications, such as
in work by Chew et al. (2020).
8.3 Future Work
As with any research, this thesis leaves a variety of future avenues to research.
Below is a non-exhaustive list of future works. Further Self-Protection is not
discussed below as it is a far larger topic than the future work of this thesis.
8.3.1 Pole Placement
As explained in Section 4.2.3 and 4.2.4, OKID and ERA together and DMDc
both create state-space models. Further, as discussed in Section 5.1.2, State-
space models can be checked for stability in a few ways. The method of import
in this context is checking the pole placement of the system. For the discrete-
time systems used in this thesis, stable poles lie within a unit circle of origin
on the real and imaginary axes, as shown in Figure 3.3. This technique is not
limited only to detecting stability, however, and can be used to move the poles
of a system into stability.
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During the longer retraining runs, a subset of the DMDc models generated
poles outwith a unit circle. These models were not used as they were rejected
by the Verification module of the Self-Learning framework; however, in the flow
in Figure 3.4 shows that Verification module can feedback to the Modelling
module, and in this case, the model could be “cured” by moving the poles back
into stability.
8.3.2 Dynamic Retraining Thresholds
In this thesis, the thresholds of the four strategies mentioned in Section 5.1
were static, but the thresholds do not need to be so. From better tuned
manual or automatic thresholds to machine learning, there is no limit to the
complexity nor the variety of methods that would satisfy the intent of the
Reevaluation module. Future work in this vein could explore the use of control-
based techniques, among a plethora of others, to dynamically move thresholds
or replace the thresholds with an entirely different piece of logic.
8.3.3 Compressed Sensing
As mentioned in Section 8.2.2, the simulator locked the control action rate
and sampling rate together. If the sampling rate is lower than the action rate,
aliasing will occur and the samples will be unable to detect frequencies above
the Nyquist frequency. In Section 6.1.1, this thesis mentioned that signals
can be reconstructed with fewer samples in select cases. Provided the Fourier
basis of the signal is sparse and samples are not evenly spaced, Compressed
Sensing (Donoho, 2006) allows for the reconstruction of a signal higher than
the apparent aliasing limit. The benefit of compressed sensing is that the exact
timing of samples in the real world may vary enough to enable better signal
recovery from the physical system, provided the clock is accurate enough.
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8.3.4 Forecasting
As mentioned in Section 4.1.3, the simulator uses two forecasting oracles: one
perfect and one simplistic. These two oracles represent the two ends of the
spectrum of working forecasters. A natural extension to the work done in
this thesis would be to utilise forecasting techniques that are more faithful to
real-world use, such as machine learning.
8.3.5 Non-Human-In-The-Loop
The removal of the Human-In-The-Loop portion of both Self-Protection meth-
ods in Chapter 6 would create a self-contained and automated system. From
the system frequency responses in Section 5.1.2 to the input frequencies in
Section 6.5, much of the data required is already in the simulation. What
remains to remove the human-in-the-loop is research into the best method to
stably remove frequencies that can cause damage and ignore those that have
no effect.
Secondly, to remove humans from the loop in the verification module, robust
verification for the chosen model needs to be built. A single, comprehensive
approach for all models is unlikely to be attainable as each system has different
failure and success modes. For example, in the simulation, heating water above
100°C was a failure state, but in a boiler, that same state is a requirement for
its functioning.
8.3.6 Actual Energy Systems
Addressing the real-world energy system limitation mentioned above in Sec-
tion 8.2.1, a future step in the vein of this research is the use of a real en-
ergy system, possibly simulated but preferably data from a physical system.
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Putting Self-Protection aside for a moment, using a simulator that replays
real boiler data allows for the testing in Chapter 5 to be applied to real-world
systems. However, testing Self-Protection is more complicated as it requires,
at least to go beyond simply detecting problematic situations, the ability to
influence a running system.
8.3.7 Prediction Testing
The prediction testing method used in this thesis does not generate metrics
to evaluate the performance of each technique. Using the implementation of
the first oracle used by this thesis allows the testing of prediction techniques
without external influence from the forecasting method. To evaluate prediction
techniques, the implementation requires considering the cases to test and the
metrics to collect.
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Appendix
Strategy DMDc OKID SINDYc
No Retraining 5622.5 1.36e9 3320.3
Step 5622.5 2.45e9 3320.3
Signed 2545.3 2.45e9 3320.3
Sign., Step 2877.8 2.45e9 3320.3
Absolute 2699.0 2.45e9 3320.3
Abs., Step 2629.4 2.45e9 3320.3
Abs., Sign. 2683.4 2.45e9 3320.3
Abs., Sign., Step 2636.1 2.45e9 3320.3
Time 2804.9 2.92e9 3320.3
Time, Step 2668.8 2.45e9 3320.3
Time, Sign. 2742.7 2.45e9 3320.3
Time, Sign., Step 2610.1 2.45e9 3320.3
Time, Abs. 2766.7 2.45e9 3320.3
Time, Abs., Step 2591.1 2.45e9 3320.3
Time, Abs., Sign. 2706.1 2.45e9 3320.3
All 2610.1 2.45e9 3320.3
Table 8.1: Complete Temperature Error Across All Retraining Strategies with
minimum time before retrain
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Figure 8.1: B Matrix Change
Longer Run Retraining Images
The following images are generated from longer, 1,048,576 step sequences to
show the system at steady state for an elongated period of time. Do note
that the following figures were generated using the minimum retrain time set-
ting, whereas the other images shown in Section 5.1.1 were able to retrain
immediately if the retrain strategies kicked in.
Bode Plots
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Figure 8.2: Principal Component Analysis of B matrix change over time
127
Figure 8.3: Absolute change in A matrix values between retraining
Figure 8.4: Absolute change in A matrix values between retraining
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Figure 8.5: Principal Component Analysis of A matrix change over time
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Figure 8.6: Principal Component Analysis of B matrix change over time
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Figure 8.7: Integral of Absolute Error for DMDc Retrains with the Signed
strategies
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Figure 8.8: Principal Component Analysis of B matrix over time
Figure 8.9: Heater error only for Octuple length run
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Figure 8.10: DMDc First Retrain Bode Plot — Phase
